

Original Research Article

Forced-Urbanization: The Alienation of Urbanization in China Continues or Not?

Abstract: Forced-urbanization that deviates from the intended purposes can lead to the alienation of some societies, especially those that had been forced to migrate to urban areas. This holds potential threats to the sustainable development of the urbanized communities. This mainly comes through the erosion of well-being rights and lack of improvement of social welfare for migrated communities. Rooted in GDP-oriented mechanical paradigm, forced-urbanization damages the urban dynamic core. As a result, cities become monsters. Could the New-style urbanization strategy proposed by the Chinese Government in 2011 curb the forced-urbanization? There is some proof that the New-style urbanization still has some risk of forced-urbanization. It is necessary to avoid new-style urbanization alienated once again by breaking the generation logic of forced urbanization effectively. Some local governments have offered certain successful experiences. But there is still a long way to go. The way out of forced-urbanization in China is still urbanization. The New-style urbanization strategy does indeed provide a possibility.

Key words : Forced-Urbanization, New-style Urbanization, Wellbeing Rights, Wellbeing Improvement

1. Introduction

In a universal sense, urbanization entails rural population migrating to cities, with a corresponding adjustment in their life style, income structure and mind state. Because of its direct economic effects, urbanization promotion is generally seen as a way to improve wellbeing (Tang, 2013). A research on population migration and urbanization from the World Bank verifies that the most effective way for poverty alleviation and economic development is to move rural population into cities and the infrastructure is fully provided by government (Saunders, 2012).

China's urbanization in true sense began in 1949 with the foundation of The People's Republic of China (PRC). It has witnessed huge achievements such as the rapid growth of urban population, national income, consumption and investment.

Under the stimulus of the government, China's urban population increased by 189,000,000 in 2011, the urbanization rate increased from 10.64% in 1949 to 53.7% in 2013. Compared with 2002, urban social retail sales of consumer goods grew by 4 trillion yuan to 15.9 trillion yuan in 2011. And there is also improvement of public service including medical treatment and social security. The data of The China National Bureau of Statistics show that the New Rural Cooperative Medical Service System experimented in 2003 has accommodated about 800,000,000 rural populations into public services in the first time.

However, this kind of urbanization is also a process of wellbeing rights erosion (School of Government BNU, 2013), and cities become monsters at the expense of villagers. For example, there are 250,000,000 migrants lived in cities while they cannot enjoy equal rights as city dwellers because of household registration requirements. Thus the actual rate of urbanization in China is lower than in developed countries 20% to 25%.

This abnormal urbanization phenomenon did not catch enough attention until 2002. Some Chinese scholars such as Lin et al. (2002) proposed a concept of Passive-Urbanization to describe it. This was the first time that the negative effect of government intervention in China' urbanization has been concerned seriously. From then on, land-lost farmers, non-agricultural employment and the transition of social structure of rural areas became the research themes of urbanization (Yang, 2005).

In the theoretical framework of passive-urbanization, land-lost farmers' urban adaptability (Zhang .B., Tong X., 2006), spatial perception(Cui B., 2010), life space remodeling (Wang M.Q., 2011), self-identity(Meng X.F., Hua X.C., 2008) and community governance participation(Lin W.K., Zhao K., 2006) had been discussed deeply. Nonetheless, the terminology of passive-urbanization could not describe really the features of dehumanization such as capital-oriented, government-led and controlled by interest groups which existed widely during urbanization in China and deviated from the intended purposes.

A new concept of Forced-Urbanization appeared in 2011 for this alienation of urbanization in China (Si L.B., Meng W.D., 2011). Forced-urbanization means not only the forced attribute but also the unconscious and rejected characters. They could be observed in some areas like land-urbanization, industrial structure transition, rural culture and psychological change. All of these separated from population urbanization and were not mentioned in previous studies.

In order to curb the forced-urbanization, Chinese government led by Xi Jinping as president and Li Keqiang as premier established New-style Urbanization strategy in 2012. According to the policy design, new-style urbanization should be people-centered, aiming to promote urban culture and public services, emphasizing wellbeing improvement.

There emerge two potential problems. The first one is the New-style Urbanization strategy could eliminate the harm caused by forced-urbanization in China? The second is whether the New-style Urbanization could really curb the forced-urbanization in China?

To answer these questions, it is important to elaborate the harm and generation logic of the forced-urbanization. The study will adopt some official statistic data and 200 random survey data during the process of demonstration.

2. The Harm Caused by Forced-Urbanization in China

Chinese Urbanization process has gone through initiation, stagnation, exploration, redeveloping and bloom stages since 1949. From the perspective of national income and consumption growth, urbanization does improve wellbeing gradually. But it cannot be denied there were some serious forced-urbanization problems which encroached on wellbeing rights. For example, there have ever been at least 800,000,000 peasants excluded out of the benefits of urbanization before the middle of 1990s.

2.1 Restriction of Farmers and land-lost farmers' economic rights

There is a typical dualistic urban-rural structure based on household registration system in China, the economic rights of farmers and land-lost farmers are always restricted.

The strategy of industrialization had given priority to urban from the 1950s to the 1990s; a typical manifestation was the price scissors obtained unfairly from the agricultural sector. From the mid-1990s onwards, urbanization in China accelerated. Urban sprawl is bound to occupy farmland. The reality in China is that current expropriation system does not recognize peasants

land contract and management right. Similarly, the current system does not recognize peasants' homestead ownership right as property rights in nature either. These facts make farmers' economic rights have no protection.

In the process of land requisition and relocation, the compensation regulated by government is not totally distributed to lost-land farmers. Because there is a collective-peasant two levels compensation system unique to China, farmers could get settlement allowance only finally.

Based on Shandong, Sichuan and Jiangsu provinces random survey data, one-off monetary compensation offers a price of ¥50,000 per mu of land, one family usually get ¥200,000 or so as a return for giving up the limited quantity of land they owned. If farmers choose to exchange their land for pension, they will only get ¥20,000-¥30,000 with a pension of ¥220 per month. They can get it only when they are at the retirement age.

In that case, generally speaking, a lost-land farmer will get compensation no more than ¥70,000 assuming that farmers' average life-span is 70 years and retirement age is 55. Economic value added by changing land's usage is distributed to government at 60-70%, to village-level economic organization at 25-30%, and to farmers only 5-10%. This result was confirmed by Zhu D.K. & Shi G.Q. (2004).

In the past, when farmers had land as means of production, they could do farming to keep self-sufficiency during peak farming season and do part-time jobs to earn a living in cities during off-season. Though not be rich, they had the rights of independent choice and transaction. How could the farmers earn a living after they were forced to lost land? This kind of employment problem did not come into the perspective of local government.

The land-lost group because of forced-urbanization has difficulties to accommodate the demand of urban occupation with low level of education and simple job skills as well. Most of them can only earn a simple living as dustmen, gardeners, builders, security guards, street vendors or driving unlicensed taxis. Their average wage is only about ¥1,500 yuan per month; it is approximately equal to the local minimum wage.

In provinces like Fujian, Anhui, Guangxi, Hunan and Sichuan etc., the communities of land-lost farmers were arranged in the integration of urban and rural areas. It is far away from downtown but near to countryside where dwelling space and living conditions are acceptable, however opportunities of jobs are rare.

So, there is a possibility that lost-land farmers' financial situation and living quality will worsen due to forced-urbanization.

2.2 Violation of farmer's political rights

Farmer is a profession but also a political identity through which a farmer enjoys unique political right known as villagers autonomy. Villager autonomy fully entrenches farmers' principal position in politics. This System has improved peasants' political apathy, political participation awareness and ability since its full implementation in 1987.

Pursuant to Village Committee Organization Law of the PRC, villagers would achieve self-management, self-education and self-service; they could implement democratic election, democratic decision, democratic management and democratic supervision with the help of village committee. "Decision on important issues of promoting rural reform and development" published in the 3rd plenary session of the 17th National Congress of Communist Part of Chin (CPC) went a

124 further step. It specified villagers' autonomy range, perfecting autonomy mechanism. As it
125 claimed, peasants supervise village affairs and finance through democratic decision mechanism
126 such as Villagers Conference, Villagers Representative Conference, Villagers Procedure and
127 Masses Comments. These mechanisms ensure peasants to exercise autonomy but not be
128 substituted or be forced.

129 Nevertheless, villagers' autonomy was seriously damaged due to restricted land trading rights.
130 Villagers' willing is either exercised or manipulated by elite class or local government (Yang S.H.,
131 Wang J.M, 2005) instead of villagers themselves.

132 Identity theory emphasizes identity of social role has some link with external societies in the first
133 place (James, 1892; Cooley, 1999). Land and villagers' autonomy are external anchors on which
134 peasants use to identify their social role, role norms, rights and obligations. From this perspective,
135 Land and villagers' autonomy are the fountainhead of Chinese peasants' self-acknowledgement.
136 Once the land is requisitioned, peasant status and political rights related to it also disappear at the
137 same time.

138 There was a question about "how do you see yourself without land" in our random survey in 2010
139 and 2011. The data from land-lost farmers in Jiangsu and Sichuan provinces found that 65.7%
140 person were falling into confusion about identity and role in urban space. They did not know
141 themselves whether to be a farmer or be a citizen. In fact, this confusion is the result of removing
142 external structure and internal identity mechanism for self-identification (Burker, 2000; Sheldon,
143 2004).

144 Whether land-lost farmers could enjoy the same treatment as citizens like hour salary standard,
145 retirement age, social insurance, health-care, community management, children right to education
146 etc. is the external manifestation of identity. In any case, role conflict between farmer and citizen
147 will be the problem facing land-lost farmers for a long run.

148 **2.3 Deprivation of the cultural rights of migrants**

149 Cultural rights are the premise and foundation for individuals or groups to take part in cultural
150 activities and enjoy cultural achievement. In areas of no matter urban or countryside, ethnic
151 majority or ethnic minority, foreland or hinterland, there have developed specific cultural types
152 fitting with the local natural environment and humanistic features.

153 Chinese rural culture manifests strong colorful spring festival pictures, high-tone folk songs and
154 fireworks. It also contains traditional superstition just like wizard and exorcism. Its presentation
155 form contains materials like ancestral hall, temple and opera stage. Immaterial such as Marriage
156 ceremony and funeral ceremony are also the presentation. Some intangible traditions like folklore
157 and village regulations are included too.

158 Generally, Chinese rural culture is noisy, out-of-order and far away from the peaceful and
159 beautiful rural image. However it actually reflects the acquaintance-based interactive relationship
160 among peasants. Daily activities of farmers including dropping by, chatting, playing jokes with
161 each other, telling family gossip, going to fair together etc. constitute the cornerstone of rural
162 culture.

163 The random survey of farmers surrounding the question of "what are the country's most precious
164 memories" showed that 68.3% considered dropping round, the festival spring couplets or pictures,
165 ancestor worship, fireworks and folk operas are the most memorable.

166 Urban culture mainly lies in cinema, theater, concert, exhibition and TV channels. Its keynote is
167 generally ordered and elegant. But what hidden in polite and respectful manners is distance and
168 indifference.

169 Engels (Chinese version 2009) described it like this: "They walks hurriedly from the sidelines ...
170 As if they have nothing to do with each other ... The more people are gathered together in a small
171 space, the more embarrassed it is when everyone show dreadful indifference and impersonal
172 solitary in the pursuit of private interests.... As we all know, such solitary and myopic self-interest
173 are basic and common principles in our modern society, but those features here, if not in any other
174 place, are most blatant and shameless which are consciously used by people. "

175 By contrast, rural traditional culture is regarded as too vulgar to be endured, ignorant and
176 backward in modern society. In many rural areas, local theatre stages and ancestral halls are
177 demolished in the guidance of government. Without such artifact foundation, rural culture market
178 could not take off. More and more, rural culture loses its successor when young farmers find other
179 ways to earn life.

180 The migrants have to withdraw in a culturally enclosed space bearing alone, or they are forced to
181 accept and admitted to urban culture. In our survey, 80.36% of farmers interviewed said he was
182 lonely and wanted to go back to countryside.

183 2.4 Foundation of civil social supports is damaged

184 In a typical urban-rural dual structure in China, peasants' rights to live and develop are seriously
185 suppressed. But farmers had constructed a relatively stable, closer and more complicated social
186 support network. Its formation is directly related to genetic, geographical and ethical relationship.

187 This kind social connection has both instrumental and emotional features. Farmers could gain
188 mutual financial assistance, neighborhood help and psychological support in this mixed
189 relationship, all the while developing an organized village-community. Village-community is
190 always regulated by traditional moral customs, habits or local rules but not official laws. It
191 provides some good social governance experiences beneficial to overcome government failure and
192 market failure.

193 Unfortunately, there were 900,000 or so villages disappeared because of forced-urbanization from
194 2000 to 2010. That makes it particularly difficult for village-community to be continued. The
195 same thing happens to old urban communities where social supports collapsed due to urban
196 redesign and demolition.

197 The outsiders could hardly predict precisely the damage caused by forced-urbanization to social
198 support. In a familiar community, residents at all levels support one another such as taking care of
199 children, informal lending, and mediating family dispute and so on. About 50% of respondents
200 had experienced getting help from neighbors or help neighbors. It is not easy to walk away from
201 such closed social support network. But these connections based on genetic, geographical and
202 ethical relationship would dribble away eventually with the forced urbanization.

203 3. The Generation Logic of Forced-Urbanization in China

204 Why did the urbanization in China alienate to a forced urbanization? Why could the urbanization
205 in China to realize the modernization erode the wellbeing rights? Simply put, the urbanization
206 mechanism in China is different from the western developed countries and other developing
207 countries such as India and Brazil.

208 **3.1 The essence of urbanization and the urbanization mechanism**

209 Urban is generally regarded as a place where congregates non-agriculture industries and
210 populations. However, the existence value of urban has long gone beyond that.

211 The experiences in developed countries and some developing countries show that population
212 migration and concentration is only the apparent type of urbanization. The essence of urbanization
213 is the transformation of social and economic structure with economic activity as the main content.
214 To improve wellbeing is the end of urbanization eventually no matter population agglomeration or
215 change of lifestyle.

216 Industrialization had ever been recognized as the urbanization mechanism in earlier period,
217 government intervention, Globalization (Keil, R., 1998; Douglass, M.,2000; Short, J.R.,2004),
218 FDI and Multi-national Corporation(Kentor, J.,1981; Sit, V.F.S., 2001; Kasarda, J.D., and
219 Greshaw, E.M., 1991) had constituted more complex urbanization mechanism since 1980s. In
220 any case, economic freedom and integrity of wellbeing rights are the foundation of urbanization.

221 Under this circumstance, Urban can make human beings be richer. Urban may also make the life
222 be more green, healthy, happy and convenient. Because of its effect of wellbeing improvement,
223 urbanization has been considered to be one of the most exciting unforgettable facts in the world
224 (Glaeser E., 2012).

225 Therefore, city is not a collection of many single people. Urban is neither a simple polymerization
226 of many kind of city infrastructure nor social organizations (Park, R. E., 1968). Collection of
227 individuals or city facilities is just the external manifestation of urban. The soul of urban is the
228 complicated tight emotional social network among residents. And there is enough commercial
229 space for residents to achieve economic self-reliance.

230 Tilly (Chinese Version 2012) had ever divided the pattern of migration into three types, i.e.
231 circulation, occupation and linkage. He stressed in particular that only linkage migration could
232 provide a positive dynamic force for the urban sustainability. Because linkage migration
233 emphasizes specific social support framework in which experienced migrants provide assistance
234 for new migrants aiming at income growth and social status improvement.

235 The key of linkage migration is freedom during the whole process. Economic freedom reflects
236 precisely the integrity of wellbeing rights. Anyone has no right to prevent others from pursuing a
237 happier life. Anyone has no authority to deprive others of the freedom of migration.

238 **3.2 The features of urbanization and urbanization mechanism in China**

239 However, Chinese population could not migrate freely because of the household registration
240 system. All residents are divided to two parts, i.e. citizen and peasant. They enjoy different rights.
241 Farmers do not enjoy any social security until 2003. The only reason is that farmers have land
242 management right.

243 In the era of comprehensive intervention of government before 1978, it was believed that focusing
244 on the use of limited resources would help to realize the industrialization strategy. When cities
245 were lack of enough food in 1960s, allocation of educated urban youth to rural areas was
246 necessary. The interests of peasants, villages and agriculture were ignored and sacrificed almost
247 completely.

248 After the age of 1980, China' urbanization sped up gradually due to globalization and FDI inflow
249 (Fuchs, R.J. et al.1987; Song S.F., Zhang K.H. 2002). It required lots of labor and land.

250 Government had to allow farmers to be migrant workers with legal proof. State-owned land was
251 sold by auction system in the name of urban-operation.

252 From then on, farmers were regarded as cheap labor for urban infrastructure construction, not
253 qualified for any security in urban. And the land auction led to land finance of local government.
254 All of these urbanization measures plundered the interests of peasants, villages and agriculture
255 once again. The income gap became more and more wide. The data of The China National Bureau
256 of Statistics show that the urban-rural income ratio was 2.90:1 in 2001, this ratio increased to
257 3.23:1 in 2010.

258 Obviously, China's urbanization has been led by the government in a large extent. Its purpose was
259 to promote economic growth, and the value paradigm was GDP-oriented performance rather than
260 wellbeing rights and economic freedom.

261 It was said that urban scale expansion could improve labor employment, especially help
262 low-skilled labors get more benefit from the increasing of employment effect (Lu M. et al, 2012).
263 However, urbanization was stereotyped by government as a magic panacea for GDP improvement
264 in a long period. Potential negative effects of the land-enclosure movement related to government
265 planning were ignored.

266 (i) There are serious wellbeing problems like housing, medical treatment and pension related to
267 population scale. (ii) Regional differences and historical cultural customs would disappear with
268 the villages fade. (iii) As the result of urban lifestyle spreading to countryside, the phenomenon of
269 rural hollowing arises, traditional ethics morals decay.

270 **3.3 Forced-urbanization is the logical result of erosion of wellbeing rights**

271 Without total economic freedom, Government-dominant model and GDP-oriented value paradigm
272 in urbanization process would be inclined to erode wellbeing rights. Forced-urbanization is the
273 logical result of this evolution.

274 For example, migrants made a great contribution to China's urbanization, but they could not enjoy
275 the fruits of urban development. They didn't get any subsidy for urban housing, education, welfare
276 for the aged or Medicare. Land-lost farmers near the suburban faced same issues.

277 But this problem became less prominent when the urbanization in China was distorted to
278 land-urbanization in 21st century. Driven by the local government to sell land to obtain financial
279 funds, land urbanization has far outpaced the population urbanization. The degree of wellbeing
280 rights encroached by land urbanization reached hitherto unknown.

281 For instance, according to Land Administration Law of the PRC article 47, compensation
282 for expropriated cultivated land shall include compensation for land, resettlement subsidies, and
283 compensation for attachments and young crops on the expropriated land. The specific amount
284 shall be six to ten times the average annual output value of the expropriated land, calculated on the
285 basis of three years before the expropriation.

286 The standard in each province varies, but the survey samples showed that one-off monetary
287 compensation was ¥50,000 per mu, a 3-person household usually got ¥200,000 or so. While
288 auction prices of land are much higher. The price of land for industrial use is about ¥150,000 per
289 mu, for commercial housing is at least ¥600,000 per mu.

290 Obviously, people's economic freedom was suppressed in the process of land urbanization led by
291 government, and the integrity of wellbeing rights was separated. Farmers were forced to transfer

the farmland; citizens had to give up the ownership of housing land under the threat of violence in forced demolitions.

The process of Chinese urbanization has witnessed industrial and agricultural product price scissors, allocation urban youth to countryside, household registration system, urban and rural talent scissors (School of Government BNU, 2013), and the deprivation of rural land, the demolition of buildings carrying history. All these have added up to destroy integrity of wellbeing rights. Therefore, the dynamic urbanization mechanism is damaged.

4. Forced-Urbanization in China Continues or Not?

In order to curb the forced-urbanization, Chinese government led by Xi Jinping as president and Li Keqiang as premier established New-style Urbanization Strategy in 2012. In the strategic framework, New-style urban is intensive, happy, smart, green, low-carbon, and effective.

4.1 Could New-style urbanization curb forced urbanization?

Accordingly, New-style urbanization is designed as people-centered, aiming to promote urban culture and public services, emphasizing wellbeing improvement actively and steadily. If that were the case, the New-style Urbanization Strategy provides some possibility to curb the forced urbanization. If that were the case, it will help China to accelerate the modernization, promote economic sustainability, and leap beyond middle-income trap bothering China.

However, there is a risk for the new-style urbanization alienated to forced-urbanization. At present stage, Chinese economic freedom has not fully realized, residents have not enjoyed totally freedom of migration. And the biggest challenge is the path dependence on the value paradigm GDP-oriented in the process of government intervention.

Some serious forced-demolitions have occurred against the spirit of New-style urbanization strategy. For example, On Oct.25th, 2013, Mrs. Tan, a primary school teacher, was removed from school to Headquarters of Relocation by District Education Bureau to persuade her mother-in-law to move out.^① The similar thing happened on October 29th 2013, the Country Committee's Organization Department in Min'hou district Fujian province asked a couple of teachers to persuade parents-in-law to knock down their houses themselves.^② In November 2013, it was reported that Yan'cheng country in Shandong province established a regulation that if whose relatives don't move out the village in time, the cadre will be suspended.^③ On March 21st 2014, there were several villagers burned in Ping'du city Shandong province because they did not agree with the compensation for removal.^④

Forced-urbanization in China continues or not?

It depends on two things. The first is to get rid of the generation logic of forced-urbanization. The second is to ensure the wellbeing development as the value paradigm of New-style urbanization strategy.

4.2 Establish wellbeing development as the value paradigm of urbanization

Reviewing the history of Chinese urbanization, wellbeing rights had ever been eroded for several times. To avoid the New-style urbanization alienated to forced urbanization, it is necessary to

^① http://www.jyb.cn/opinion/mtzl/201310/t20131029_557293.html

^② <http://news.big5.enorth.com.cn/system/2013/10/29/011408890.shtml>

^③ http://heze.qlwb.com.cn/html/2013/xinwen_1120/1384.html

^④ http://legal.gmw.cn/2014-03/27/content_10811428.htm

330 establish wellbeing development as the value paradigm of urbanization. This is the essential
331 demand of urbanization.

332 For migrants, the primary issue is to find a stable job which is the fundamental of economic and
333 social status. Gradually, migrants would be familiar with the habits and mindset of local citizens.
334 They will really convert to citizens after they are used to it. And they will develop some social
335 network in urban.

336 In the process, some proper protection from government is indispensable. Based on the
337 characteristics of urban-rural binary structure in China, first of all, government should provide
338 same public services for all people. Or government should ensure people have the economic
339 freedom especially migration freedom.

340 The purpose of wellbeing development is compatible with Rawls' theory of justice and the theory
341 of social justice represented by Amartya Sen, emphasizing social opportunities and economic
342 participation (Rawls J. B., 1988; Amartya Sen, 2002). Both assume the integrity of wellbeing
343 rights which should not be violated for any reason.

344 Given that premise, it is possible for New-style urbanization to curb the forced urbanization.
345 Resources and achievements in urbanization process could be reasonably distributed to all groups.
346 Everyone's identity and social role could achieve consistency between inner cognitive and external
347 validation (Guo T.H., 2013).

348 **4.3 The effect of government actions to curb forced urbanization**

349 As an important composition of Likonomics, New-style urbanization strategy has obvious
350 intention to stop encroaching wellbeing rights.

351 Comprehensive Reform of Certain Major Issue Decision established by the Third Plenary Session
352 of 18th National Congress of CPC in 2012 stressed that New-style urbanization should establish an
353 impartial and sustainable social security system to benefit all people.

354 It stated specifically that farmers could participate equally in modernization process, and share the
355 gains of urbanization. It also stressed peasants would have more rights over property. Price
356 scissors should be narrowed in the future.

357 But the statement of intention at the central government is not sufficient to curb forced
358 urbanization. The local government at various levels to take practical actions is required. Several
359 local governments have made some efforts to guarantee wellbeing rights.

360 For example, the government of De'zhou city in Shandong provided conveniences for land-lost
361 farmers to guarantee their own rights. Farmers could supervise community finance. They could
362 involve in community projects as long as they are happy.^①

363 Another example is Jiangsu. The government introduced a series of practices to develop wellbeing.
364 A project named groundwork focuses on employment assistance and employment training. A
365 project named elevation focuses on entrepreneurship supporting. There are two measures
366 especially for farmers named accumulation project and security project. The accumulation project
367 concentrates on long-term mechanism of property and financial income improvement. The
368 security project aims to ensure necessary security for land lost farmers.^②

^① <http://news.sina.com.cn/o/2011-07-23/084022862970.shtml>

^② http://www.jshrss.gov.cn/xwzx/gddt/201305/t20130502_122686.htm

369 Those innovations of local government offered some successful experiences to guarantee
370 wellbeing rights. But there is still a long way to curb forced urbanization, including but not limited
371 to following.

372 No1. Migrants would merge into neighborhoods and businesses. They are not subject to
373 discrimination and exclusion in urban. No2. Their offspring could enjoy same education with the
374 urban children. No3. Government should be watchful of the reproduction of urban-rural dual
375 structure in urban.

376 5. Conclusions

377 In summary, China has made some great success at urbanization. But at the same time, wellbeing
378 rights had been severely eroded, especially for farmers. The characteristic of forced-urbanization
379 in the process of urbanization in China has ever been significant.

380 Forced-urbanization has caused serious harm to wellbeing rights, including restriction of famers'
381 economic rights, violation of farmers' political rights, deprivation of migrants' cultural rights. And
382 the foundation of civil social supports is damaged too in the process.

383 The primary reason of forced-urbanization is that the value paradigm of urbanization in China was
384 GDP-oriented performance rather than wellbeing rights and economic freedom. In order to curb
385 the forced-urbanization, Chinese government established New-style Urbanization Strategy in
386 2012.

387 Forced-urbanization in China continues or not? The statement of intention at the central
388 government is not sufficient. The local government at various levels to take practical actions is
389 required. Some local governments have offered certain successful experiences. But there is still a
390 long way to go.

391 Urban and village are the two forms of human civilization. They are interdependent though
392 they respectively have different ethics, operation rules and value. It is dangerous not to
393 consider the prospect of peasants, rural areas and agriculture. The way out of
394 forced-urbanization in China is still urbanization. The New-style urbanization strategy does indeed
395 provide a possibility.

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