

Forced-Urbanization: The Alienation of Urbanization in China

Does it Continue or Not?

Abstract: Forced-urbanization that deviates from the intended purposes can lead to the alienation of some societies, especially those that had been forced to migrate to urban areas. This holds potential threats to the sustainable development of the urbanized communities. This mainly comes through the erosion of well being rights and lack of improvement of social welfare for migrated communities. Rooted in GDP-oriented mechanical paradigm, forced-urbanization damages the urban dynamic core. As a result cities become monsters. With the New-style urbanization strategy proposed by Chinese Government in 2011, which seeks to curb the forced-urbanization, there is some evidence that the New-style urbanization still has some risk of forced-urbanization. So it is necessary to avoid the unintended purposes of New-style urbanization by breaking the generation logic of forced urbanization. Some local governments have offered certain successful experiences. But there is still a long way to go because of some real constraints. However, the way out of forced-urbanization in China is still urbanization, but preferably through the New-style urbanization strategy that takes into consideration various possibilities.

Key words: Forced-Urbanization, New-style Urbanization, Wellbeing Improvement, Wellbeing Rights

1. Introduction

In a universal sense, urbanization entails rural population migrating to cities, with a corresponding adjustment in their life style, income structure and mind state. Due to its direct economic effects, urbanization promotion is generally seen as a way to improve wellbeing (Tang, 2013). A research on population migration and urbanization by the World Bank verifies that the most effective way for poverty alleviation and economic development is to move rural population into cities where the infrastructure is fully provided by the government (Saunders, 2012).

China's urbanization in true sense began in 1949 with the foundation of the People's Republic of China (PRC). It has witnessed huge achievements that include the rapid growth of urban population, national income, consumption and investment. China's urban population increased by 189,000,000 in 2011, the urbanization rate increased from 10.64% in 1949 to 53.7% in 2013. Compared with 2002, urban social retail sales of consumer goods grew by 4 trillion yuan to 15.9 trillion yuan in 2011 and there is also improvement of public service including medical treatment and social security. The China National Bureau of Statistics show that the New Rural Cooperative Medical Service System experimented in 2003 has initially accommodated about 800,000,000 rural populations into public services.

However, this kind of urbanization is also a process of wellbeing rights erosion (School of Government BNU, 2013), and cities become monsters at the expense of villagers. For example, there are 250,000,000 migrants that live in cities do not enjoy equal rights as city dwellers because of household registration requirements. Thus the actual rate of urbanization in China is lower 20-25% than in most developed countries.

This abnormal urbanization phenomenon did not catch enough attention until 2002. Some Chinese scholars such as Lin et al. (2002) proposed a concept of Passive-Urbanization to describe it. This was the first time that the negative effect of government intervention in China' urbanization was given serious attention. From then on, land-lost farmers, non-agricultural employment and the transition of social structure of rural areas became the research themes of urbanization (Yang, 2005).

In the theoretical framework of passive-urbanization, land-lost farmers' urban adaptability (Zhang .B., Tong X., 2006), spatial perception(Cui B., 2010), life space remodeling (Wang M.Q., 2011), self-identity(Meng X.F., Hua X.C., 2008) and community governance participation(Lin W.K., Zhao K., 2006) had been discussed extensively. Nonetheless, the terminology of passive-urbanization could not describe really the features of dehumanization such as capital-oriented, government-led and controlled by interest groups which existed widely during urbanization in China and deviated from the intended purposes.

A new concept of Forced-Urbanization appeared in 2011 for this alienation of urbanization in China (Si L.B., Meng W.D., 2011). Forced-urbanization means not only the forced attribute but also the unconscious and rejected characters. They could be observed in some areas like land-urbanization, industrial structure transition, rural culture and psychological change. All of these separated from population urbanization and were not mentioned in previous studies.

In order to curb the forced-urbanization, Chinese government led by Xi Jinping as president and Li Keqiang as premier established the New-style Urbanization strategy in 2012. According to the policy design, new-style urbanization should be people-centered, aiming to promote urban culture and public services, emphasizing wellbeing improvement.

There emerge two potential uncertainties. Firstly could the New-style Urbanization strategy eliminate the harm caused by forced-urbanization in China? Secondly, whether the New-style Urbanization could really curb the forced-urbanization in China? To address these uncertainties, it is important to elaborate the harm and generation logic of the forced-urbanization.

This research adopted social survey method supplemented by some official statistics. As one part of the project named New-style Urbanization and China Minsheng Development which was supported by National 985 Fund, this research did a random survey of 210 landless farmer in some provinces such as Jiangsu, Shandong, Sichuan and Fujian etc. in 2010 and 2011. The main contents of survey are to understand some issues such as the identity and role confirmation, recognition of urban life and the emotional memory. The results of the survey show that most of the respondents were forced to lost their land and converted to be citizens. Though they admit that housing condition is improved, they feel alone in emotion and uncomfortable with the neighborhood relationship in urban. Some respondents reflect that they did not enjoy same benefits as citizens.

2. The Harm Caused by Forced-Urbanization in China

Chinese Urbanization process has gone through initiation, stagnation, exploration, redeveloping and bloom stages since 1949. From the perspective of national income and consumption growth, urbanization in China did improve wellbeing, but it cannot be denied that there were some serious forced-urbanization problems that encroached on wellbeing

rights. In short, the harm caused by forced-urbanization to farmers can be categorized into following:

a) Restriction on economic rights of farmers and land-lost farmers

There is a typical dualistic urban-rural structure based on household registration system in China, the economic rights of farmers and land-lost farmers are always restricted.

The strategy of industrialization had given priority to urban from the 1950s to the 1990s; a typical manifestation was the price scissors obtained unfairly from the agricultural sector. From the mid-1990s onwards, urbanization in China accelerated. The reality is that with current expropriation system, the land contract and management right of peasants is not recognized. Similarly, the current system does not recognize peasants home ownership rights as property rights. These give no protection to farmers' economic rights.

In the process of land requisition and relocation, the compensation regulated by government is not totally distributed to lost-land farmers. Based on random survey data in some provinces such as Shandong, Sichuan and Jiangsu etc., one-off monetary compensation offers a price of ¥50,000 per mu of land, one family usually get ¥200,000 or so as a return for giving up the limited quantity of land they owned. If farmers choose to exchange their land for pension, they get ¥20,000-¥30,000 with a pension of ¥220 per month, which they can only get when they are at the retirement age.

Generally, a farmer who has lost his land will get compensation of no more than ¥70,000, assuming that farmers' average life-span is 70 years and retirement age is 55. Economic value added by changing land's usage is distributed to government at 60-70%, to village-level economic organization at 25-30%, and to farmers only 5-10%. This finding was also confirmed by Zhu D.K. & Shi G.Q. (2004).

In the past, when farmers had land as means of production, they could do farming to sustain themselves during peak farming season and do part-time jobs to earn a living in cities during off-season. Though not rich, they had the rights of independent choice and transaction. The outstanding question is how the farmers could earn a living after they had been dispossessed of their land.

In most instances, the land-lost group, because of forced-urbanization has difficulties to adapt to the demands of urban occupation with low level of education and simple job skills. Most of them can only earn a simple living as dustmen, gardeners, builders, security guards, street vendors or driving unlicensed taxies. Their average wage is only about ¥1,500 yuan per month, which is equivalent to the local minimum wage.

In provinces like Fujian, Anhui, Guangxi, Hunan and Sichuan etc., the communities of land-lost farmers were almost arranged at the fringe areas to urban. It is far away from downtown but near to countryside where dwelling space and living conditions are acceptable, however job opportunities are limited. This illustrates that the financial situation and the quality of life of land-lost farmers decline once they are forced to adopt urban lifestyle through forced urbanization.

b) Violation of farmer's political rights

Farming is a profession but also a political identity through which a farmer enjoys unique political right known as villagers autonomy. Villager autonomy fully entrenches farmers' principal position in politics. This System has improved peasants' political apathy, political participation awareness and ability since its full implementation in 1987.

Pursuant to Village Committee Organization Law of the PRC, villagers would achieve self-management, self-education and self-service. They could implement democratic election, democratic decision, democratic management and democratic supervision with the help of village committee. "Decision on important issues of promoting rural reform and development" published in the 3rd plenary session of the 17th National Congress of Communist Part of China (CPC) went a further step. As it claimed, peasants supervise village affairs and finance through democratic decision mechanism such as Villagers Conference, Villagers Representative Conference, Villagers Procedure and Masses Comments. These mechanisms ensured that peasants exercise autonomy independently.

Nevertheless, villagers' autonomy was affected because of restricted land trading rights. Villagers' willing is either exercised or manipulated by elite class or local government instead of villagers themselves (Yang S.H., Wang J.M, 2005), sometimes the villagers representative is designated by superior officer.

Identity theory emphasizes identity of social role has some link with external societies in the first place (James, 1892; Cooley, 1999). Land and villagers' autonomy are external anchors on which peasants use to identify their social role, role norms, rights and obligations. From this perspective, Land and villagers' autonomy are the fountainhead of Chinese peasants' self-acknowledgement. Once the land is requisitioned, peasant status and political rights related to it also disappear simultaneously.

In a random survey conducted in 2010 and 2011, data from land-lost farmers in Jiangsu and Sichuan provinces reflected that 65.7% person were falling into confusion about identity and role in urban space. They did not know whether they were farmers or urban citizens. In fact, this confusion is a resultant effect of removing external structure and internal identity mechanism for self-identification (Burker, 2000; Sheldon, 2004).

Whether land-lost farmers could enjoy the same benefits as citizens such as hour-salary standard, retirement age, social insurance, health-care, community management, children right to education etc. is the external manifestation of identity. In any case, role conflict between farmer and citizen is likely to be a persistent challenge facing land-lost farmers for a long run.

c) Deprivation of the cultural rights of migrants

Cultural rights are the premise and foundation for individuals or groups to take part in cultural activities and enjoy cultural achievement. China' vast geography and many ethnic groups have developed diverse cultural types fitting with local natural environment and humanistic features, however these types culture are usually thought to be of two category: urban and rural.

Generally, Chinese rural culture is noisy, out-of-order and far away from the peaceful and beautiful rural image. It actually reflects the acquaintance-based interactive relationship among peasants. Daily activities of farmers including dropping by, chatting, playing jokes with each other, telling family gossip, going to fair together etc. constitute the cornerstone of rural culture.

Chinese rural culture manifests strong colorful spring festival pictures, high-tone folk songs and fireworks. It also contains traditional superstition just like wizard and exorcism. Its presentation form contains materials like ancestral hall, temple and opera stage. Immaterial such as Marriage ceremony and funeral ceremony are also the presentation. Some intangible traditions like folklore and village regulations are also included.

165 The random survey conducted among farmers in sampling provinces showed that 68.3%
166 considered dropping round, the festival spring couplets or pictures, ancestor worship, fireworks
167 and folk operas to be the most memorable characters of their rural cultures.

168 Urban culture entails in cinema, theater, concert, exhibition and TV channels. Its keynote is
169 generally ordered and elegant, however what is hidden behind the character of politeness and
170 respectfulness is distance and loneliness.

171 By contrast, rural traditional culture is regarded as too vulgar to be endured, ignorant and
172 backward in modern society. In many rural areas, local theatre stages and ancestral halls are
173 demolished in the guidance of government. Without such artifact foundation, rural culture market
174 could not take off. The migrants have to withdraw, or they are forced to accept urban culture.

175 **d) Foundation of civil social supports is damaged**

176 In a typical urban-rural dual structure in China, peasants' rights to live and develop are seriously
177 suppressed. However, farmers had constructed a relatively stable, closer and more complicated
178 social support network. Its formation is directly related to genetic, geographical and ethical
179 relationship.

180 This kind social connection has both instrumental and emotional features. Farmers could gain
181 mutual financial assistance, neighborhood help and psychological support in this mixed
182 relationship, while developing an organized village-community. Village-community is always
183 regulated by traditional moral customs, habits or local rules but not official laws. It provides some
184 good social governance experiences beneficial to overcome government failure and market failure.

185 Unfortunately, more than 900,000 villages disappeared because of forced-urbanization between
186 2000 and 2010. That makes it particularly difficult for village-community to be continued. The
187 same thing happens to old urban communities where social supports collapsed due to urban
188 redesign and demolition.

189 The outsiders could hardly predict the damage caused by forced-urbanization to social support. In
190 a familiar community, residents at all levels support one another such as taking care of children,
191 informal lending, and mediating family dispute and so on. In our survey, about 50% of
192 respondents had experienced getting help from neighbors or help neighbors. It is not easy to walk
193 away from such closed social support network. These connections based on genetic, geographical
194 and ethical relationship would fizzle away with the forced urbanization.

195 **3. The Generation Logic of Forced-Urbanization in China**

196 Urbanization mechanism in China is different from the western developed countries and other
197 developing countries such as India and Brazil. Its most salient feature is government-led based on
198 the authority of administration and Chinese Communist, its purpose was to promote economic
199 growth, and the value paradigm was GDP-oriented performance rather than wellbeing rights and
200 economic freedom.

201 **a) The essence of urbanization and the urbanization mechanism**

202 Urban is generally regarded as a place where congregates non-agriculture industries and
203 populations. It is the same in the worldwide famous metropolis such as New York, Paris, London,
204 Beijing, Mumbai, and so on. Industrial production and the output value of tertiary industry are the
205 main sources of GDP in each city.

206 However, the existence value of urban has long gone beyond that. Population migration and
207 concentration is the apparent character of urbanization. The essence of urbanization is the
208 transformation of social and economic structure.

209 Industrialization had ever been recognized as the urbanization mechanism in earlier period. Since
210 1980s, government intervention, globalization (Keil, R., 1998; Douglass, M.,2000; Short,
211 J.R.,2004), FDI and multi-national corporation(Kentor, J.,1981; Sit, V.F.S., 2001; Kasarda, J.D.,
212 and Grenshaw, E.M., 1991) had been thought to be the more complex urbanization mechanism in
213 which economic freedom and integrity of wellbeing rights are the foundation.

214 Urban areas can make human beings rich. They may also make one's life more prosperous.
215 Because of these benefits, urbanization is considered to be one of the exciting and unforgettable
216 experiences (Glaeser E., 2012).

217 According to the theory of urban sociology, urban is not a collection of many single people, and it
218 is not a simple polymerization of many kind of city infrastructure and social organizations either
219 (Park, R. E., 1968). Collection of individuals or urban facilities is just the external manifestation
220 of urban. The soul of urban is the complicated tight emotional social network among citizens. And
221 there is enough commercial space for people to make a living.

222 Tilly (Chinese Version 2012) had ever divided the pattern of migration into three types, i.e.
223 circulation, occupation and linkage. He stressed in particular that only linkage migration could
224 provide a positive dynamic force for the urban sustainability. Because linkage migration
225 emphasizes specific social support framework in which experienced migrants provide assistance
226 for new migrants aiming at income growth and social status improvement.

227 The premise of linkage migration is economic freedom which means anyone has no authority to
228 deprive others of the freedom of migration, and anyone has no right to prevent others from
229 pursuing a happier life. The essence of linkage migration is the integrity of wellbeing rights.

230 **b) Features of urbanization and urbanization mechanism in China**

231 As Chinese population could not migrate freely between rural and urban areas because of the
232 household registration system, all residents are divided to two parts, i.e. citizen and peasant.
233 Because of this system, they enjoy different rights. Before 2003, farmers did not enjoy any social
234 security. The reason is being that they have land management right.

235 During the era of comprehensive intervention of government i.e. before 1978, it was believed that
236 focusing on the use of limited resources would help to realize the industrialization strategy. When
237 cities lacked enough food, allocation of educated urban youth to rural areas was necessary. The
238 interests of peasants, villages and agriculture were ignored completely.

239 After 1980, China' urbanization sped up gradually due to globalization and FDI inflow (Fuchs, R.J.
240 et al.1987; Song S.F., Zhang K.H. 2002). It required lots of labor and land. Government allowed
241 farmers to migrate to urban areas with integrant migrant worker certificate. State-owned land was
242 sold by auction system in the name of urban-operation.

243 From then on, farmers were regarded as cheap labor for urban infrastructure construction. The
244 land auction led to land finance of local government. All of these urbanization measures plundered
245 the interests of peasants, villages and agriculture once again. The income gap became more and
246 more wide. The data of the China National Bureau of Statistics show that the urban-rural income
247 ratio was 2.90:1 in 2001, this ratio increased to 3.23:1 in 2010.

Obviously, China's urbanization has been led by the government in a large extent. Its purpose was to promote economic growth, and the value paradigm was GDP-oriented performance rather than wellbeing rights and economic freedom.

It was said that urban scale expansion could improve labor employment, especially help low-skilled labors get more benefit from the increasing of employment effect (Lu M. et al, 2012). However, urbanization was stereotyped by government as a magic panacea for GDP improvement in a long period. Potential negative effects of the land-enclosure movement related to government planning were ignored.

These potential negative effects mainly include three aspects. First, there is a huge pressure of wellbeing demand like housing, medical treatment and pension. Second, regional diversity related to rural culture would disappear with the villages fade. Third, traditional ethics morals decay, leading to discipline relaxation and some kind of social disorder.

c) Forced-urbanization is the logical result of erosion of wellbeing rights

Without total economic freedom, Government-dominant model and GDP-oriented value paradigm in urbanization process is inclined to erode wellbeing rights. Forced-urbanization is the logical result of this evolution.

For example, migrants made a great contribution to China's urbanization, but they could not enjoy the fruits of urban development. They didn't get any subsidy for urban housing, education, welfare for the aged or Medicare. Land-lost farmers near the suburban faced same challenge.

But this problem became less prominent when the urbanization in China was distorted to land-urbanization in 21st century. Driven by the local government to sell land to obtain financial funds, land urbanization has far outpaced population urbanization. Local governments attach greater importance to land-transfer fees rather than wellbeing rights.

For instance, according to Land Administration Law of the PRC article 47, compensation for expropriated cultivated land shall include compensation for land, resettlement subsidies, and compensation for attachments and young crops on the expropriated land. The specific amount shall be six to ten times the average annual output value of the expropriated land, calculated on the basis of three years before the expropriation.

The standard in each province varies, but the survey samples showed that one-off monetary compensation was ¥50,000 per mu, a 3-person household usually got ¥200,000 or so. While auction prices of land are much higher. The price of land for industrial use is about ¥150,000 per mu, for commercial housing is at least ¥600,000 per mu.

Obviously, people's economic freedom was suppressed in the process of land urbanization led by government, and the integrity of wellbeing rights was separated. Farmers were forced to transfer the farmland; citizens had to give up the ownership of housing land under the threat of violence in forced demolitions.

The process of Chinese urbanization has witnessed industrial and agricultural product price scissors, allocation urban youth to countryside, household registration system, urban and rural talent scissors (School of Government BNU, 2013), and the deprivation of rural land, the demolition of buildings carrying history. All these have added up to destroy integrity of wellbeing rights. Therefore, the dynamic urbanization mechanism is damaged.

4. The future of forced-Urbanization in China

290 In order to curb the forced-urbanization, Chinese government led by Xi Jinping as president and Li
291 Keqiang as premier established New-style Urbanization Strategy in 2012. In the strategic
292 framework, the New-style urban will be focusing on intensive, happy, smart, green, low-carbon,
293 and effective development.

294 a) Could New-style urbanization curb forced urbanization?

295 Accordingly, New-style urbanization is designed to be people-centered, aiming to promote urban
296 culture and public services, emphasizing wellbeing improvement. The New-style Urbanization
297 Strategy seeks to provide some possibility to curb the forced urbanization. It seeks to help China
298 to accelerate the modernization, promote economic sustainability, and leap beyond middle-income
299 trap that bothers China.

300 However, the new-style urbanization strategy might alienate to forced-urbanization for some real
301 constraints. At present, residents have not enjoyed total freedom of migration. The biggest
302 challenge is the path dependence on the GDP-oriented value paradigm which was the impulse of
303 high-speed urbanization in China.

304 Some serious forced-demolitions have occurred against the spirit of New-style urbanization
305 strategy. For example, On Oct.25th, 2013, Mrs. Tan, a primary school teacher, was removed from
306 school to Headquarters of Relocation by District Education Bureau, and was required to persuade
307 her mother-in-law to demolish.^① The similar incidence happened on October 29th 2013, the
308 Country Committee's Organization Department in Min'hou district Fujian province asked a
309 couple of teachers to persuade parents-in-law to demolish their houses themselves.^② In November
310 2013, it was reported that Yan'cheng country in Shandong province established a regulation that
311 those whose relatives don't move out of the village in time, the cadre will be suspended from their
312 duties.^③ On March 21st 2014, there were several villagers that were burned in Ping'du city
313 Shandong province because they did not agree with the compensation for removal and the put up
314 tend to stop the construction.^④

315 Obviously, the New-style urbanization strategy could not necessarily curb forced-urbanization if
316 the generation logic of forced-urbanization is not eliminated. Only when it is wellbeing-oriented,
317 government fulfills supervisory duties well, the New-style urbanization strategy could achieve its
318 original intentions.

319 Reviewing the history of Chinese urbanization, wellbeing rights had been eroded for several times.
320 To avoid the New-style urbanization alienated to forced urbanization, it is necessary to establish a
321 value paradigm wellbeing-oriented.

322 For migrants, the primary issue is to find a stable job which is the fundamental of economic and
323 social status. Migrants would be familiar with the habits and mindset of local citizens step by step.
324 They will really convert to citizens after they are used to it. They also may develop some kind of
325 social support network in urban.

326 In the process, some proper protection from government is indispensable. Based on the
327 characteristics of urban-rural binary structure in China, first of all, government should provide
328 same public services for all people.

① http://www.jyb.cn/opinion/mtzl/201310/t20131029_557293.html

② <http://news.big5.enorth.com.cn/system/2013/10/29/011408890.shtml>

③ http://heze.qwb.com.cn/html/2013/xinwen_1120/1384.html

④ http://legal.gmw.cn/2014-03/27/content_10811428.htm, China Youth Daily, 2014-03-27,
<http://news.cntv.cn/2014/03/26/ARTI1395763297652309.shtml>

329 The purpose of wellbeing development is compatible with Rawls' theory of justice and the theory
330 of social justice represented by Amartya Sen, emphasizing social opportunities and economic
331 participation (Rawls J. B., 1988; Amartya Sen, 2002). Both assume the integrity of wellbeing
332 rights should not be violated for any reason.

333 Given that premise, it is possible for New-style urbanization to curb the forced-urbanization.
334 Resources, achievements and opportunities in urbanization could be reasonably distributed to all
335 groups. Everyone's identity and social role could achieve consistency between inner cognitive and
336 external validation (Guo T.H., 2013).

337 **b) The effect of government actions to curb forced urbanization**

338 New-style urbanization strategy has obvious intention to stop encroaching wellbeing rights.
339 Comprehensive Reform of Certain Major Issue Decision established by the Third Plenary Session
340 of 18th National Congress of CPC in 2012 stressed that New-style urbanization should establish an
341 impartial and sustainable social security system to benefit all people.

342 It stated specifically that farmers could participate equally in modernization process, and share the
343 gains of urbanization. It also stressed peasants would have more rights over property. Price
344 scissors should be narrowed in the future.

345 But the statement of intention at the central government level is not sufficient to curb forced
346 urbanization. It requires that the local government at all levels to take practical actions. Several
347 local governments have made some efforts to guarantee wellbeing rights.

348 For example, the government of De'zhou city in Shandong provided conveniences for land-lost
349 farmers to guarantee their own rights. Farmers could supervise community finance. They could
350 involve in community projects as long as they are happy to do that.^①

351 Another example is Jiangsu. The government introduced a series of practices to develop wellbeing.
352 A project named groundwork focuses on employment assistance and employment training.
353 Another project named elevation focuses on entrepreneurship supporting. There are two measures
354 especially for farmers named accumulation project and security project. The accumulation project
355 concentrates on long-term mechanism of property and financial income improvement. The
356 security project aims to ensure necessary security for land lost farmers.^②

357 Those innovations of local governments offered some successful experiences to curb
358 forced-urbanization, but there is still a long way to go, including but not limited to following.

359 Firstly, Migrants would merge into neighborhoods and businesses. They are not subject to
360 discrimination and exclusion in urban. Secondly, the offspring of migrants could enjoy same
361 education with the urban children. Thirdly, government should be watchful of the reproduction of
362 urban-rural dual structure in urban.

363 **5. Conclusions**

364 China has made great success in urbanization. But at the same time, wellbeing rights had been
365 severely eroded, especially for farmers. The characteristic of forced-urbanization in the process of
366 urbanization in China has ever been significant.

^① <http://news.sina.com.cn/o/2011-07-23/084022862970.shtml>

^② http://www.jshrss.gov.cn/xwzx/gddt/201305/t20130502_122686.htm

367 Forced-urbanization has caused serious harm to farmers, including restriction on economic rights,
368 violation of political rights, and deprivation of migrants' cultural rights. The foundation of civil
369 social supports is damaged too in the process.

370 The primary reason of forced-urbanization is that the value paradigm of urbanization in China was
371 GDP-oriented rather than wellbeing-oriented. In order to curb the forced-urbanization, Chinese
372 government established New-style Urbanization Strategy in 2012.

373 The intention at the central government level is not sufficient. It requires that the local government
374 at all levels to take practical actions. Some local governments have offered certain successful
375 experiences. But there is still a long way to go.

376 The way out of forced-urbanization in China is still urbanization, but preferably through the
377 New-style urbanization strategy that takes into consideration various possibilities.

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