

Forced-Urbanization: The Alienation of Urbanization in China

Abstract: Forced-urbanization that deviates from the intended purposes can lead to the alienation of some societies, especially those that had been forced to migrate to urban areas. This holds potential threats to the sustainable development of the urbanized communities. This likelihood mainly comes through the erosion of well being rights and lack of improvement of social welfare for migrated communities. Rooted in GDP-oriented mechanical paradigm, forced-urbanization damages the dynamic mechanism of urban. As a result, cities become monsters. With the New-style Urbanization strategy proposed by Chinese Government in 2011, which seeks to curb the forced-urbanization, there are some evidences that the New-style Urbanization still has some risk of forced-urbanization. So it is necessary to avoid the unintended purposes of New-style Urbanization by breaking the generation logic of forced-urbanization. Some local governments have offered certain successful experiences. But there is still a long way to go because of some real constraints. However, the way out of forced-urbanization in China is still urbanization but preferably through the New-style Urbanization strategy that takes various possibilities into consideration.

Key words: Forced-Urbanization, New-style Urbanization, Wellbeing Improvement, Wellbeing Rights

1. Introduction

In a universal sense, urbanization entails rural population migrating into cities, with a corresponding adjustment in their life style, income structure and mind state. Due to its direct economic effects, urbanization promotion is generally seen as a way to improve wellbeing (Tang R.W., 2013). A research on population migration and urbanization by the World Bank verifies that the most effective way for poverty alleviation and economic development is to move rural population into cities where the infrastructure is fully provided by the government (Saunders, Chinese Version 2012).

In the true sense, China's urbanization began in 1949 with the foundation of the People's Republic of China (PRC). It has witnessed huge achievements that include the rapid growth of urban population, national income, consumption and investment. China's urban population increased by 18.9 million in 2011, the urbanization rate increased from 10.64% in 1949 to 53.7% in 2013. Compared with 2002, urban social retail sales of consumer goods grew by 4 trillion yuan to 15.9 trillion yuan in 2011 and there was also improvement of public service including medical treatment and social security. National Bureau of Statistics of PRC verified that the New Rural Cooperative Medical Service System experimented in 2003 had initially accommodated about 80 million rural populations into public services.

However, this kind of urbanization is also a process of wellbeing rights erosion (School of Government BNU, 2013), and cities become monsters at the cost of villagers. For example, there are 25 million migrants that live in cities without enjoying equal rights as city dwellers because of household registration requirements. Thus the actual rate of urbanization in China is about 20-25% lower than in most developed countries.

This abnormal urbanization phenomenon did not catch enough attention until 2002. Some Chinese scholars such as Lin et al. (2002) proposed a concept of Passive-Urbanization to describe it. It was the first time that the negative effect of government intervention in China' urbanization had drawn serious attention. From then on, land-lost farmers' issues such as non-agricultural employment and the transition of social structure of rural areas became the research themes of urbanization (Yang, 2005).

In theoretical framework of Passive-Urbanization, land-lost farmers' urban adaptability (Zhang B., Tong X., 2006), spatial perception (Cui B., 2010), life space remodeling (Wang M.Q., 2011), self-identity (Meng X.F., Hua X.C., 2008) and community governance participation (Lin W.K., Zhao K., 2006) had been discussed extensively. Nonetheless, the terminology of Passive-Urbanization could not factually describe the features of dehumanization such as capital-oriented, government-led and controlled by interest groups. Those features existed widely during urbanization in China, and they were the indications of deviation from the intended purposes of urbanization.

A new concept of Forced-Urbanization was proposed in 2011 to illustrate this alienation of urbanization in China (Si L.B., Meng W.D., 2011). Compared with the term of Passive-Urbanization, the terminology of Forced-Urbanization means not only the forced attribute but also the unconscious and rejected characters. They could be observed in some areas like land-urbanization, industrial structure transition, rural culture and psychological change. All of them separated from population urbanization and were not mentioned in previous studies.

In order to curb the forced-urbanization, Chinese Government led by President Xi Jinping and Premier Li Keqiang put forward the New-style Urbanization strategy in 2012. According to the policy outline, New-style Urbanization should be people-oriented, aiming at promoting urban culture and public services, emphasizing wellbeing improvement.

But two potential uncertainties arise. For one thing, will the New-style Urbanization strategy eliminate the harm caused by forced-urbanization in China? For another, Could the New-style Urbanization really curb the forced-urbanization in China?

As one part of the project named New-style Urbanization & China Minsheng Development supported by China National 985 Fund, this research did a random survey of 210 landless farmers in some provinces such as Jiangsu, Shandong, Sichuan and Fujian etc. in 2010 and 2011. The main aim of the survey was to understand some special issues, such as the identity and role confirmation, recognition of urban life and the emotional memory of the respondents.

The results show that most of the respondents were forced to lose their land and were converted to urban citizens. Though they admitted that housing conditions had been improved, they felt alienated and uncomfortable with the unfamiliar neighborhoods' relationship in urban environment. Some respondents indicated that they could not enjoy same benefits as those native urban citizens.

These phenomena lead the study further to analyze in details the harm caused by forced-urbanization and its generation logic. In addition, the study attempts to explore possible future of forced-urbanization in China against the background of the New-style Urbanization strategy.

2. The Harm Caused by Forced-Urbanization in China

Chinese Urbanization process has gone through initiation, stagnation, exploration, redeveloping and bloom stages since 1949. From the perspective of national income and consumption growth, urbanization in China did improve wellbeing, but it cannot be denied that there were some serious forced-urbanization problems that encroached on wellbeing rights. In short, the harm caused by forced-urbanization to farmers can be categorized into following four ways.

a) Restriction on economic rights of farmers and land-lost farmers

There is a typical dualistic urban-rural structure based on household registration system in China, the economic rights of farmers and land-lost farmers are always restricted.

The strategy of industrialization had given priority to urban areas from 1950s to 1990s. A typical evidence of urban priority or urban superiority was the Price-Scissors the agricultural sector endured. From the mid-1990s onwards, urbanization in China accelerated. The reality is that with current expropriation system, the land contract and management right of peasants is not recognized. Similarly, the current system does not recognize peasants home ownership rights as property rights. These give no protection to farmers' economic rights.

In the process of land requisition and relocation, the compensation regulated by government is not totally distributed to lost-land farmers. Based on random survey data in provinces such as Shandong, Sichuan and Jiangsu etc., the one-off monetary compensation provided to the farmers according to official standards is **¥50,000 per mu of land.**^① One family can usually get about ¥200,000 as compensation for giving up their limited land. If farmers choose to exchange their land for pension, they can get about ¥20,000 to ¥30,000 with a pension of ¥220 per month, which they can only access to at the retirement age.

In real terms, a farmer who has lost his land will get a compensation of no more than ¥70,000, assuming that farmers' average **life expectancy is 70 years** and retirement age is 55. Because of the unique state-owned and collective-owned land system, the collective-owned land should be firstly changed into state-owned land through the national collection or acquisition, **and then** state-owned land can be used for commercial development or construction after the auction. The economic value added by changing land's usage is distributed to government at 60-70%, to village-level economic organization at 25-30%, and to farmers only 5-10%. This finding was also confirmed by Zhu D.K.& Shi G.Q. (2004).

In the past, when farmers had land as means of production, they could do farming to sustain themselves during peak farming season and do part-time jobs to earn a living in cities during off-season. Though not rich, they had the rights of independent choice and transaction. The outstanding question is how farmers could earn a living after they had been dispossessed of their land. **This question is also the potential flashpoint of conflict between the city administration and vendors from land-lost farmers.**

In most instances, the land-lost group because of forced-urbanization has difficulties to adapt to the demands of urban occupation with low level of education and simple job skills. Most of them can only earn a simple living as dustmen, gardeners, builders, security guards, street vendors or driving unlicensed taxies. Their average wage is only about ¥1,500 per month, which is lower than or equivalent to the local minimum wage.

^① **Mu is a kind of measure of land in China; one mu is equal to about 0.067 hectares.**

124 In provinces like Fujian, Anhui, Guangxi, Hunan and Sichuan etc., communities of land-lost
125 farmers are almost confined to the fringe sections of urban areas. They are far away from
126 downtown. Even though dwelling space and living conditions there are acceptable, job
127 opportunities are limited. This illustrates that the financial situation and the quality of life of
128 land-lost farmers decline once they are forced to adopt urban lifestyle through forced urbanization.

129 **b) Violation of farmer's political rights**

130 Farming is a profession but also a political identity with which a farmer enjoys unique political
131 right known as villagers autonomy. Villager's autonomy fully entrenches farmers' principal
132 position in politics. This System has improved peasant's political apathy, political participation
133 awareness and ability since its full implementation in 1987.

134 Pursuant to Village Committee Organization Law of PRC, villagers would achieve
135 self-management, self-education and self-service. They could implement democratic election,
136 democratic decision, democratic management and democratic supervision with the help of village
137 committee. "Decision on important issues of promoting rural reform and development" published
138 in the 3rd plenary session of the 17th National Congress of Communist Party of China (CPC) went
139 a further step in asserting peasant's autonomy. It claimed that peasants have the right to supervise
140 village affairs and finance through democratic decision mechanism such as Villagers Conference,
141 Villagers Representative Conference, Villagers Procedure and Masses Comments. These
142 mechanisms ensured that peasants exercise autonomy independently.

143 Nevertheless, villager's autonomy was affected because of restricted land trading rights. Villager's
144 aspirations are either exercised or manipulated by elite class or local government instead of
145 villagers themselves (Yang S.H., Wang J.M, 2005). In some instances, villager's representatives
146 are designated by superior officer.

147 Land and villager's autonomy are external anchors on which peasants use to identify their social
148 role, role norms, rights and obligations. From this perspective, Land and villager's autonomy are
149 the fountainhead of Chinese peasants' self-determination. Once the land is requisitioned, peasant
150 status and political rights linked to it disappear simultaneously. This fact confirmed the viewpoint
151 of identity theory which emphasizes identity of social role has some link with external societies in
152 the first place (Cooley, Chinese Version 1999).

153 In a random survey conducted in 2010 and 2011, data collected from land-lost farmers in Jiangsu
154 and Sichuan provinces reflected that 65.7% of farmers were confused about their identity and role
155 in urban space. They did not know whether they were farmers or urban citizens. This confusion is
156 a resultant effect of removing external structure and internal identity mechanism for
157 self-determination and identification (Burker, 2004; Sheldon, 2000).

158 Whether land-lost farmers could enjoy the same benefits as urban citizens such as hourly-salary,
159 retirement age, social insurance, health-care, community management, children right to education
160 etc. is the external manifestation of identity. In any case, role conflict between farmer and urban
161 citizen is likely to be a persistent challenge facing land-lost farmers in a long term.

162 **c) Deprivation of the cultural rights of migrants**

163 Cultural rights are the premise and foundation for individuals or groups to take part in cultural
164 activities and enjoy cultural achievement. Based on the vast geography and ethnic diversity, there
165 has developed diverse cultural types fitting with local natural environment and humanistic features

166 across China. However these different types of cultures are thought of belonging to two categories
167 i.e. urban and rural.

168 Traditionally, people always think Chinese rural culture is noisy, out-of-order and far away from
169 the peaceful and beautiful rural image. Noisy actually reflects the acquaintance-based interactive
170 relationship among peasants. Daily activities of farmers including dropping by, chatting, playing
171 jokes with each other, telling family gossip, going to fair together etc. constitute the cornerstone of
172 rural culture.

173 Chinese rural culture manifests strong colorful spring festival pictures, high-tone folk songs and
174 fireworks. It also contains traditional superstition just like wizard and exorcism. Its presentation
175 form contains materials like ancestral hall, temple and opera stage. Immaterial such as Marriage
176 ceremony and funeral ceremony are also the presentation. Some intangible traditions like folklore
177 and village regulations are also included.

178 The random survey conducted among farmers in sampled provinces showed that 68.3% agreed
179 that dropping round, the festival spring couplets or pictures, ancestor worship, fireworks and folk
180 operas were the most memorable characters of their rural cultures.

181 Urban culture entails in cinema, theater, concert, exhibition and TV channels. Its keynote is
182 generally ordered and elegant, however, what hide behind the character of politeness and
183 respectfulness is distance and loneliness.

184 By contrast, rural traditional culture is regarded too vulgar to be endured, ignorant and backward
185 in modern society. In many rural areas, local theatre stages and ancestral halls are demolished
186 under the guidance of government. Without such artifact foundation, rural culture market could
187 not take off. The migrants have to withdraw, or they are forced to accept urban culture. Spirit
188 Island phenomenon appears and would last a long time.

189 **d) Destruction of the foundation of civil social supports**

190 In a typical urban-rural dual structure in China, peasant's rights to live and develop are seriously
191 suppressed. However, farmers have constructed a relatively stable, closer and more complicated
192 social support network. Its formation is directly related to genetic, geographical and ethical
193 relationship.

194 This kind social connection has both instrumental and emotional features. Farmers could gain
195 mutual financial assistance, neighborhood help and psychological support in this mixed
196 relationship, while developing an organized village-community. Village-community is always
197 regulated by traditional moral customs, habits or local rules but not official laws. It provides some
198 good social governance experiences beneficial to overcome government failure and market failure.

199 Unfortunately, more than 900,000 villages disappeared because of forced-urbanization between
200 2000 and 2010, which made it particularly difficult for village-community to be continued. The
201 same thing happened to old urban communities where social supports collapsed due to urban
202 redesign and demolition.

203 The outsiders could hardly predict the damage caused by forced-urbanization to social support. In
204 a familiar community, residents at all levels support one another such as taking care of children,
205 informal lending, and mediating family disputes and so on. In our survey, about 50% of
206 respondents had experienced getting help from neighbors or helping neighbors. It is not easy to

207 leave from such closed social support network. These connections based on genetic, geographical
208 and ethical relationship would fizzle away with the forced-urbanization.

209 **3. The Generation Logic of Forced-Urbanization in China**

210 Urbanization mechanism in China is different from the western developed countries and other
211 developing countries such as India and Brazil. Its most salient feature is government-led based on
212 the authority of administration and Chinese Communist Party, whose purpose is to promote
213 economic growth. Its value paradigm was GDP-oriented performance rather than wellbeing rights
214 and economic freedom in the past decades. **This goes against the spirit of urbanization.**

215 **a) The essence of urbanization and the urbanization mechanism**

216 Urban formed with human settlement. Its original function was a military defense. But it gradually
217 transformed into economic center, business center or industrial center because of commercial
218 development and industrialization. **A large number of population migrated from villages to urban**
219 **areas is the outstanding manifestation.** Industrial production and the output value of tertiary
220 industry become the main sources of GDP in urban areas. It is widely acknowledged that urban is
221 the symbol of prosperity and civilization. This is particularly obvious in famous metropolis of the
222 world such as New York, Paris, London, Beijing and Mumbai.

223 **However, the** existence value of urban has long gone beyond the simple means of population
224 concentration. Population migration and concentration **is only the apparent** character of
225 urbanization. The essence of urbanization is the transformation of social and economic structure
226 and the quality of life improvement.

227 Since 1980s, government intervention, globalization (Keil, R., 1998; Douglass, M., 2000; Short,
228 J.R.,2004), FDI and multi-national corporation(Kentor, J.,1981; Kasarda, J.D. and Grenshaw, E.M.,
229 1991) had been thought to be the more complex urbanization mechanism in which economic
230 freedom and integrity of wellbeing rights are the foundation.

231 Urban areas can make human beings rich. They may also **make people's life** more prosperous.
232 Because of these benefits, urbanization is considered to be one of the exciting and unforgettable
233 experiences (Glaeser E., Chinese Version 2012).

234 According to the theory of urban sociology, urban is neither a collection of many single people nor
235 a simple polymerization of urban infrastructure and social organizations (Park, R. E., 1968).
236 Collection of individuals or urban facilities is just the external manifestation of urban. The soul of
237 urban is the complicated tight emotional social network among citizens; and there is enough
238 commercial space for people to make a living.

239 Tilly (Chinese Version 2012) divided the pattern of migration into three types, i.e. circulation,
240 occupation and linkage. He stressed in particular that only linkage migration could provide a
241 positive dynamic force for the urban sustainability. Because linkage migration emphasizes specific
242 social support framework in which experienced migrants provide assistance for new migrants
243 aiming at income growth and social status improvement.

244 The premise of linkage migration is economic freedom which means anyone has no authority to
245 deprive others of the freedom of migration, and anyone has no right to prevent others from
246 pursuing a happier life. The essence of linkage migration is the integrity of wellbeing rights.

247 **b) Features of urbanization and urbanization mechanism in China**

248 As Chinese people could not migrate freely between rural and urban areas because of the
249 household registration system, thus all residents are divided into two parts, i.e. citizen and peasant.
250 As a result, they **enjoy different wellbeing rights**. Before 2003, farmers did not enjoy any social
251 security. The reason is only that they have land operation right.

252 During the era of comprehensive intervention of government before 1978, it was believed that
253 focusing on the use of limited resources would help to realize the industrialization strategy. When
254 cities lacked enough food, reallocation of educated urban youth to rural areas was necessary. **At**
255 **that time**, the interests of peasants, villages and agriculture were ignored completely.

256 After 1980, China's urbanization sped up gradually due to globalization and FDI inflow (Fuchs, R.J.
257 et al.1987; Song S.F., Zhang K.H. 2002). It required lots of labor and land. Government allowed
258 farmers to migrate to urban areas with integrant migrant worker certificate. State-owned land was
259 sold by auction system in the name of urban operation.

260 From then on, farmers were regarded as cheap labor for urban infrastructure construction. The
261 land auction led to land finance for local government. All of these urbanization measures
262 plundered the interests of peasants, villages and agriculture **once more**. The income-gap between
263 urban and rural areas became more and more wide. Data from China National Bureau of Statistics
264 of PRC showed that the urban-rural income ratio was 2.90:1 in 2001, and it increased to 3.23:1 in
265 2010.

266 Obviously, China's urbanization has been led by the government in a large extent. Its purpose was
267 to promote economic growth, and the value paradigm behind was GDP-oriented performance
268 **instead of** wellbeing rights and economic freedom.

269 It was said that urban scale expansion could improve labor employment, especially help
270 low-skilled labors get more benefit from the increasing of employment effect (Lu M. et al, 2012).
271 However, urbanization was stereotyped by government as a magic panacea for GDP improvement
272 in a long period. Potential negative effects of the land-enclosure movement related to government
273 planning were ignored totally.

274 These potential negative effects mainly include three aspects. First, whether or not to be noticed,
275 there is a huge pressure of wellbeing demand like housing, medical care and pension. Second,
276 regional diversity related to rural culture would disappear with the villages fade. Third, traditional
277 ethics morals decay, leading to discipline relaxation and some kind of social disorder.

278 **c) Forced-urbanization: a logical result of erosion of wellbeing rights**

279 Without total economic freedom, Government-dominated model and GDP-oriented value
280 paradigm in China's urbanization process are inclined to erode wellbeing rights.
281 Forced-Urbanization is the logical result of this evolution.

282 For example, migrants made great contributions to China's urbanization, but they could not enjoy
283 the fruits of urban development. They didn't get any subsidy for urban housing, education, welfare
284 for the aged or Medicare. Land-lost farmers near the suburban faced the same challenges.

285 But this problem became less prominent when the urbanization in China was distorted to
286 land-urbanization **at the beginning of 21st century**. Driven by the local government to sell land for
287 financial funds, land urbanization has far outpaced population urbanization. Local governments
288 attached greater importance to land-transfer fees rather than wellbeing rights.

289 For instance, according to Land Administration Law of the PRC article 47, compensation
290 for expropriated cultivated land shall include compensation for land, resettlement subsidies, and
291 compensation for attachments and young crops on the expropriated land. The specific amount
292 shall be six to ten times the average annual output value of the expropriated land, calculated on the
293 basis of three years before the expropriation.

294 The standard in each province varies, but the survey samples showed that one-off monetary
295 compensation was ¥50,000 per mu, a 3-person household usually got ¥200,000 or so. While
296 auction prices of land are much higher. The price of land for industrial use is about ¥150,000 per
297 mu, for commercial housing is at least ¥600,000 per mu.

298 Obviously, people's economic freedom was suppressed in the process of land urbanization led by
299 government, and the integrity of wellbeing rights was separated. Farmers were forced to transfer
300 the farmland; citizens had to give up the ownership of housing land under the threat of violence in
301 forced demolitions.

302 The process of China's urbanization has witnessed industrial and agricultural product price
303 scissors, allocation urban youth to countryside, household registration system, urban and rural
304 talent scissors (School of Government BNU, 2013), and the deprivation of rural land, **the**
305 **demolition of historical buildings**. All these have added up to destroy integrity of wellbeing
306 rights. Therefore, the dynamic urbanization mechanism is damaged.

307 **4. The future of forced-Urbanization in China**

308 In order to curb the forced-urbanization, Chinese Government led by President Xi Jinping and
309 Premier Li Keqiang put forward New-style Urbanization Strategy in 2012. In the strategic
310 framework, the New-style urban will focus on intensive, happy, smart, green, low-carbon, and
311 effective development.

312 **a) Could New-style urbanization curb forced-urbanization?**

313 Accordingly, New-style Urbanization is designed to be people-centered, aiming to promote urban
314 culture and public services, emphasizing wellbeing improvement. The New-style Urbanization
315 Strategy seeks to provide some possibility to curb the forced urbanization. It seeks to help China
316 to accelerate the modernization, promote economic sustainability, and leap beyond middle-income
317 trap which is bothering China.

318 However, the New-style Urbanization strategy might alienate to forced-urbanization for some real
319 constraints. At present, residents **still have** not enjoyed total freedom of migration. The biggest
320 challenge is the path dependence on the GDP-oriented value paradigm **which used to be the**
321 impulse of high-speed urbanization in China.

322 Some serious forced-demolitions have occurred against the spirit of New-style Urbanization
323 strategy. For example, On Oct.25th, 2013, Mrs. Tan, a primary school teacher, was removed from
324 school to Headquarters of Relocation by District Education Bureau, and was required to persuade
325 her mother-in-law to demolish. ^① Similar incidence happened on October 29th 2013, the Country
326 Committee's Organization Department in Min'hou district Fujian province asked a couple of
327 teachers to persuade parents-in-law to demolish their houses themselves. ^② In November 2013, it
328 was reported that Yan'cheng country in Shandong province established a regulation that those

^① http://www.jyb.cn/opinion/mtzl/201310/t20131029_557293.html

^② <http://news.big5.enorth.com.cn/system/2013/10/29/011408890.shtml>

329 whose relatives don't move out of the village in time, the cadre will be suspended from their
330 duties.^① On March 21st 2014, several villagers were burned in tend in Ping'du city Shandong
331 province because they did not agree with the compensation for removal and they put up a campsite
332 to stop the construction.^②

333 Obviously, the New-style Urbanization strategy could not necessarily curb the trend of
334 forced-urbanization if the generation logic of forced-urbanization is not eliminated. Only when it
335 is wellbeing-oriented, government fulfills supervisory duties well, the New-style Urbanization
336 strategy could achieve its original intentions.

337 Reviewing the history of China's urbanization, wellbeing rights had been eroded for several times.
338 To avoid the New-style Urbanization alienated to forced urbanization, it is necessary to establish a
339 wellbeing-oriented value paradigm.

340 For migrants, the primary issue is to find a stable job which is the fundamental of economic and
341 social status. Migrants would be familiar with the habits and mindset of local citizens step by step.
342 They will really convert to citizens after they get used to the urban situation. They also may
343 develop some kind of social support network in urban.

344 In the process, some proper protection from government is indispensable. Based on the
345 characteristics of urban-rural binary structure in China, first of all, government should provide
346 same public services for all people.

347 The purpose of wellbeing development is compatible with Rawls' Theory of Justice and the
348 Theory of Social Justice represented by Amartya Sen, emphasizing social opportunities and
349 economic participation (Rawls J. B., Chinese Version 1988; Amartya Sen, Chinese Version 2002).
350 Both assume the integrity of wellbeing rights should not be violated for any reason.

351 Given that premise, it is possible for New-style Urbanization to curb the forced-urbanization.
352 Resources, achievements and opportunities in urbanization could be reasonably distributed to all
353 groups. Everyone's identity and social role could achieve consistency between inner cognitive and
354 external validation (Guo T.H., 2013).

355 **b) The effect of government actions to curb forced urbanization**

356 New-style Urbanization strategy has obvious intention to stop encroaching wellbeing rights.
357 Comprehensive Reform of Certain Major Issue Decision established by the Third Plenary Session
358 of 18th National Congress of CPC in 2012 stressed that New-style Urbanization should establish
359 an impartial and sustainable social security system to benefit all people.

360 It stated specifically that farmers could participate equally in modernization process, and share the
361 gains of urbanization. It also stressed peasants would have more rights over property than ever
362 before. Price scissors is expected to be narrowed in the future.

363 But the statement of intention at the central government level is not sufficient to curb forced
364 urbanization. It requires that local governments at all levels to take practical actions. Several local
365 governments have made some efforts to guarantee wellbeing rights.

^① http://heze.qfwb.com.cn/html/2013/xinwen_1120/1384.html

^② http://legal.gmw.cn/2014-03/27/content_10811428.htm, China Youth Daily, 2014-03-27,
<http://news.cntv.cn/2014/03/26/ARTI1395763297652309.shtml>

For example, the government of De'zhou city in Shandong provided conveniences for land-lost farmers to guarantee their own rights. Farmers could supervise community finance. They could involve in community projects as long as they are happy to do that.^①

Another example is from Jiangsu province. Its government introduced a series of practices to develop wellbeing. A project named **Groundwork** focuses on employment assistance and employment training. Another project named **Elevation** focuses on entrepreneurship supporting. There are two measures especially for farmers named **Accumulation Project and Security Project**. The Accumulation Project concentrates on long-term mechanism of property and financial income improvement. The Security Project aims to ensure necessary security for land lost farmers.^②

Those innovations of local governments offered some successful experiences to curb forced-urbanization, but there is still a long way to go, including but not limited to the followings.

Firstly, Migrants would merge into neighborhoods and businesses. They are not subject to discrimination and exclusion in urban. Secondly, the offspring of migrants could enjoy the same education with the urban children. Thirdly, government should be watchful of the reproduction of urban-rural dual structure in urban.

5. Conclusions

China has made great success in urbanization. **But wellbeing rights, at the same time, have been severely eroded, especially for farmers.**

Forced-urbanization has caused serious harm to farmers, including restriction on economic rights, violation of political rights, and deprivation of migrants' cultural rights. The foundation of civil social supports **was damaged as well in the process.**

The primary reason of forced-urbanization is that the value paradigm of urbanization in China was GDP-oriented rather than wellbeing-oriented. In order to curb the forced-urbanization, Chinese Government established New-style Urbanization Strategy in 2012. The random survey shows that **some kinds of risks of** forced-urbanization still exist in the implementation process of New-style Urbanization strategy.

The intention at the central government level is not sufficient. **It requires the local governments at all levels to take practical actions.** Some local governments have offered certain successful experiences. **However, the way is still long to go.**

The way out of forced-urbanization in China is still urbanization, but preferably through the New-style Urbanization strategy that takes various possibilities into consideration.

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