

Original Research Article

**Are Family Firms Really More Long-Term
Oriented? Evidence from China**

ABSTRACT

Long-term orientation is often regarded as the reason why family firms excel non-family firms. However, there are very few empirical studies. This article examined whether and when family firms were more long-term oriented, employing 1980 firms from Chinese Private Enterprise Survey. The results show that family ownership does not necessarily lead to firm long-term oriented behaviors. Only in those family firms with succession intention and greater family control intention, family ownership could significantly promote more long-term oriented investments.

Keywords: family firm; long-term orientation; family succession intention

1. INTRODUCTION

During the past 30 years since the reform and opening up policy, Chinese economy has experienced exponential growth and will continue to play a significant role in global economy. The increasing number of Chinese firms on the Fortune 500 list, from 12 companies in 2001 to 100 in 2014, further implied the growing importance of Chinese enterprises. Undoubtedly, entrepreneurship, especially in family forms, is a key driving force behind the transformation for China to become the second largest economy worldwide. While many western scholars

have recognized the importance of family firms, large part of family firms in emerging economies, such as China are under-researched. There is great urgency for us to expand our knowledge of family firms, the most important and prevalent actor in Chinese economy.

In general, firms are easily controlled and owned by families during the start-up stage. But large numbers of firms in China are still family controlled, even after long-term growth and would be fear of losing family control. While family entrepreneurs in Chinese context are mostly influenced by Confucian doctrine, they are still heterogeneous units. For a long time, scholars have been working hard to find out the advantages and performance implications of family influence, but coming to very mixed results. So are the comparative studies between family and non-family firms. However, the long-term orientation and belief in sustainable development and trans-generational succession of family firms are widely recognized [1]. In addition, more and more scholars begin to care more about the socio-emotional wealth of family firms rather than just pursuing economic goals. Departing from the traditional focus on short-term financial performance, this study attempts to explore whether family ownership promotes long-term oriented behaviors, and how family intention on control and succession influences this relationship.

The debates on short-term and long-term can be dated back to 1990s. [2] concluded the managerial short-termism as the basic reasons why U.S. corporations lose their competitive advantage to foreign firms, especially those from Germany and Japan. These two countries have been always regarded as having long-term orientation tradition while American

managers pay too much attention to short-term benefits and don't want to invest for long-term development. Just one simple example, Freudenberg, a multinational family firm from Germany, explicitly incorporates the long-term orientation in its guiding principles. It reads as *"After more than 160 years, the Freudenberg Group is and will remain a wholly owned family enterprise. We strongly believe that our long term business orientation is a major strength that benefits our customers and partners"*.

It draws much more implications for Chinese family firms, in an institutional transformation age. As the market economy develops, thousands of entrepreneurs rushed into the investment tide driven by the fast-growth wealth and seeming easy-to-get benefits, ignoring or exiting original industries. Moreover, the release of Chinese Growth Enterprise Monitor Board (GEMB, *chuangyeban* in Chinese) further promoted this trend. The release of GEMB brought thousands of entrepreneurs to be millionaires or billionaires in one night and became confused of the future development. Even in family firms controlled by descendent of entrepreneurs, they prefer financial investment to prior industrial operation, which will be eventually harmful to the sustainable development of the firm and even the whole economy.

We want to explore two questions in this article: (1) Are family firms really more long-term oriented (or pursuing long-term oriented behaviors)? (2) What kind of family firms may perform more long-term oriented behaviors rather than short-term? Although many studies have attributed the superior performance advantages of family firms to the strong long-term orientation, the empirical examination especially large-scale quantitative studies are rare.

This study tested the influence of family related factors on the temporal choice in a Chinese family firm context, using the database of The 9th Chinese Private Enterprises Survey to draw more insights for family business research and practice in the emerging economy.

2. LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESES

As mentioned, economic short-termism has triggered great debate in America. It is the economic short-termism that is considered to be the important reason why American firms fall behind [3]. The short-termism(inter-temporal choice) in Laverly's work is defined as "*the course of action that is best in the short term is not the same course of action that is best over the long run*". While long-term orientation is corresponded to short-termism, meaning "*the tendency to prioritize the long-range implications and impact of decisions and actions that come to fruition after an extended time period*" [4]. [5] even incorporated the long-term orientation as a dimension of organizational culture. The F-PEC scale developed by [6] also includes the measurement of future and long-term orientation, such as future support and long-term participation. There are still other ways to express the long-term orientation, including extended time horizon [7], long-term financial goals [1] and sustainable development [8].

Family business literature argues that family firms are more long-term oriented than non-family firms [9] [10], and performing better than non-family firms on a range of indicators, such as profitability [11], efficiency [12] and sales growth [13]. [14] attributes family firms'

long-term orientation to transgenerational succession, longer term CEO [10], as well as the popularity of family firms in the performance lagging industry. In reality, family firms have to find a balance between short-term performance and long-term orientated behaviors. That involves the inter-temporal or multi-temporal decision making. Inter-temporal choice often need weigh the short-term and long-term benefits. Some scholars believe that firms should take actions to obtain long-term value [15], however, some level of short-term performance is often the prerequisite to survive [16]. For the family business, the trade-off between short-term and long-term seems an eternal topic.

[1] pointed out that family shareholders have a longer investment horizon in relation to the other shareholders. And compared to the short-term projects, they may prefer to invest in long-term projects. Based on this, compared to other types of shareholders, family shareholders have more patient capital, and are more willing to consider some investment decisions with non-short-term results. It is believed that family ownership is an important driving force for the family preference to long-term investment in the time domain, as family owners are more likely to act as steward rather than an agent [17] [18]. Compared to non-family business, family business executives also tend to have a longer term [14]. From the long-term-oriented test of the family business in his doctoral thesis, [19] found that only when the family members serve as chairman or CEO, will the family business invest more in long-term projects than non-family businesses and long-term investment projects in the family firms are less affected by changes in cash. Based on this, family firms bear the objectives from the controlling family and from the business world simultaneously. When

controlling a firm, the family is no longer a simple shareholder or manager. In this case, family and business are combined, or business has been part of the family. The family has been a symbol of the firm and what the firm does could be closely related with the family's reputation and image.

Recent years, socio-emotional theory has emerged and developed as a homegrown theory in family business research field. More and more scholars realized the necessary transformation from pure financial to non-financial aspects of family firms. We try to extend SEW model in family firm by investigating the long-term orientation behaviors. [9] propose that what controlling families concern is preserving their socio-emotional wealth, which means *"non-financial aspects of the firm that meet the family's affective needs, such as identity, the ability to exercise family influence and the perpetuation of the family dynasty."* Family firms always strive to nonfinancial goals such as longevity, family prosperity and family harmony. In case of family ownership, we argue that family owners are not passive shareholders, but active stewards of the family and would invest more in long-term projects, like innovation and talent cultivation to obtain better long-term performance. Therefore, we propose that:

Hypothesis 1: Family ownership is positively related to a firm's long-term orientation.

Additionally, many family firms dream to build a family dynasty by passing the business to the descendants and controlled by the family [20]. [21] also pointed out that family

intention to control and succession was one important reason why family firms behaved different from non-family firms. When the family controls a firm, the enterprise will be no longer a freely traded asset, but became a symbol of family wealth and status. Family control is regarded as the precondition for family continuity [22]. Previous studies on family business may focus more on the governance and performance benefits, the entrepreneurial values need more exploration. As it noted, family control is the foundation for family entrepreneurship and trans-generational development [23]. However, family succession research indicates that lack of capable family decedents or losing entrepreneurship spirit may lead to family business failure or die out. It also happens that family firms may choose to exit the market by selling out when they could not find proper family members to succeed or manage. Thus, we argue that family intention could influence the relationship between family involvement and long-term orientation. When the family have strong intention to control the firm or succession to the next generation, family owners tend to make more decisions considering for the long-term benefits. So, we present that:

Hypothesis 2: Family intention will strengthen the relationship between family ownership and firm long-term orientation. Specifically, the higher the family succession and control intention, the relationship between family ownership and long-term orientation will be stronger.

3. METHODOLOGY

3.1 Samples and Data Collection

Family business is prevalent in Chinese publicly-listed firms and private-owned enterprises. But family control levels and approaches are diverse. Different from previous studies mostly focusing on publicly-listed firms, our dataset is from the Chinese Private Enterprises Survey in 2010, which has been used for research publications on Journal of Business Venturing, etc. [24]. The survey is conducted jointly by the United Front Work Department of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, the All China Industry and Commerce Federation, the China Society of Private Economy at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, and China State Administration for Industry & Commerce. To achieve a balanced representation across all regions and industries in China, the survey used the multi-stage stratified random sampling method and selected 4900 private firms, which accounted for 0.55% of nationally registered private enterprises in 2009, distributing among different regions and industries.

The survey was based on questionnaire and interviews in necessary. Local employees of All China Federation of Industry and Commerce and China State Administration for Industry & Commerce directly conducted the survey. The entrepreneurs or owners of the selected private firms were required to fill the questionnaire. Finally, 4614 valid questionnaires were returned, with a overall response rate of 94.16%. The survey time span is from 2008 to 2009 and covered 31 regions and 19 industries.

3.2 Measurement

Dependent variable

Long-term orientation. Based on the classifications and measurements from [8] and [19], we measure long-term orientation in a behavioral perspective, using firm long-term investments in R&D and employee training. Two variables are represented in the form of proportion of sales revenues. We constructed a principle component and computed the mean value for the cross test of long-term orientation.

Independent variables

Family ownership. Family ownership is the most widely used variable reflecting family influence and also regarded as a proxy for SEW [25] [26]. In this study, we define the family business as those that the entrepreneur and his/her family own at least 50% ownership of the firm. The survey provides relevant information for us to identify family firm. There are two questions on this: (1)What's your equity ownership of the firm? (2)What's your family member's equity ownership of the firm? We combined the two questions to present family ownership and only included those firms with family ownership higher than 50%.

Moderators

Family intention. Family intention includes succession intention and control intention, indicating the connecting intensity between the family and the firm. We measured family succession intention by asking "How do you think about the succession issue of the firm?"^① and coded into a dummy variable according to the answer (1=with family succession

^① The available choice of this question is: a. Let my children take over the business; b. Don't let my children work in the firm; c. Just give equity to my children but don't let them work in the firm; d. Only leave some living expenses to my children; e. others. f. Not considering this issue. If the entrepreneur chose a or c, it means he/she has the succession intention.

intention, 0=no family succession intention). The scale for family control intention is adapted from the 5-Liket scale developed by [27] and [28], by asking entrepreneurs about their opinions on the following five items, including “Family should own more than 50% to control the firm”, “Firm’s key strategic decision should be made by family members”, “Firm’s key management position should be controlled by family members”, “Family members involve in the business helps firm development” and “It’s an obligation for me to provide work opportunities for my family members”.

Control variables

According to previous studies, this study included the entrepreneur, firm and industry level characteristics that may affect business inter-temporal choice decisions in the model as control variables. Firm characteristics like firm age, firm size, previous year performance measured in return on sales (ROS). We also controlled for entrepreneurs’ age, gender and human capital reflected by education level. Industry is coded into 18 dummies in regression models. Table 1 provides the detailed information for variable definitions.

Table 1. Variable definitions

concepts	variables	definitions
Long-term orientation	LTO_PCA	Principle component for ratio of firm investment in R&D and employee training on sales.
	LTO_MEAN	Mean value for ratio of firm investment in R&D and employee training on sales.
Family ownership	FO	The proportion of family holdings.
Family control intention	FSI	Liket scales on 5 items.
Family succession intention	SUC	A binary variable, 1 indicates with succession intention.
Firm age	FIRMAGE	The difference between the year 2010 and the founding year.
Firm size	LNEMP	The nature log of firm employee numbers.
Firm previous	ROS	Return on sales in year 2008.

performance			
Industry	IND		Industry dummied into 19 binary variables, according to National Statistics Classification.
Market development	MARINDEX		Market development index, from Fan and Wang(2013).
Entrepreneur age	AGE		The difference between the year 2010 and the entrepreneurs' born year.
Entrepreneur gender	GENDER		A binary variable, 1 indicates male.
Entrepreneur human capital	EDU		Entrepreneur's education level, 1= primary school, 2=junior middle school, 3= senior middle school, 4=junior college, 5=undergraduate, 6= master.

222

223

224 4. RESULTS

225 4.1 Descriptive statistics

226

227 Table 2 reports the descriptive statistics of the key variables. In our survey of Chinese private
 228 enterprises, 87.95 percent are classified as family business, indicating the prevalence of
 229 family firms in China. Due to the missing data for our key variables, only 1980 family firms
 230 are included in our final analysis. As to the long-term orientation behavior, a firm averagely
 231 invests 0.8% of its yearly revenues on R&D programs and employee training. In terms of the
 232 family firm context, family ownership is rather high, the mean value reaching 91% and
 233 68.99% of family firms are wholly owned by a family. In 1980 family firms, only 489 firms
 234 showed explicit intentions for succession, while family firm owners differ in their intentions for
 235 family control. Even though most family owners expressed the importance of family
 236 ownership control and family responsibility, they do not seem to advocate family
 237 management. Most of our sample firms are entrepreneurial firms and has operated for about

9.16 years on average. We also report the entrepreneur characteristics of the firm. The mean age of CEO is 45.87, lack of University education and only 13.48% are female. It shows that Chinese entrepreneurs are still male dominated and driven by people with few school education.

Table 2. Descriptive Statistics

	LTO_PC	FO	SUC	FINT	FIRIMAGE	LNEMP	AGE	GENDER	EDU	ROS	MARINDEX
LTO_PC	1.00										
FO	0.00	1.00									
SUC	0.04	0.08	1.00								
FINT	-0.03	0.13	0.21	1.00							
FIRIMAGE	0.00	0.05	0.13	0.01	1.00						
LNEMP	0.03	-0.06	0.05	-0.13	0.25	1.00					
AGE	0.00	-0.04	0.25	0.06	0.24	0.21	1.00				
GENDER	-0.03	0.01	0.03	-0.01	0.07	0.08	0.05	1.00			
EDU	-0.09	0.08	0.16	0.14	-0.02	-0.20	0.17	0.02	1.00		
ROS	0.22	-0.01	0.03	-0.01	0.01	0.04	0.02	0.01	-0.02	1.00	
MARINDEX	-0.06	0.00	0.04	0.00	0.12	0.08	0.06	0.06	0.03	-0.01	1.00
MEAN	-0.05	0.91	0.25	2.93	9.16	3.86	45.87	0.87	3.21	0.00	8.63
STD.DEV.	1.06	15.96	0.43	0.91	4.59	1.52	8.70	0.34	1.09	0.90	2.20
MIN	-0.45	50.00	0.00	1.00	2.00	0.69	21.00	0.00	1.00	-1.84	0.38
MAX	10.42	100.00	1.00	5.00	21.00	9.19	93.00	1.00	6.00	37.79	11.80

Note: N=1980.

4.2. Regression analysis and hypotheses testing

Table 3 and Table 4 report OLS regression results for the family influence and firm long-term orientation. Table 3 used the principle component of long-term orientation (LTO_PC) and Table 4 for mean computed long-term orientation (LTO_MEAN). Model 1 only includes control variables as the basic model. Model 2 adds family ownership variable to test hypothesis 1. Model 3 and 4 further incorporates the interaction effect of family intention one by one to test hypothesis 2. Although not reported, all the models control for the industry effect.

Direct effects. Hypothesis 1 predicts that family ownership is positively with firm's long-term orientation. In model 2, the coefficient estimation between family ownership and long-term orientation is positive but insignificant ($\beta=0.126$, $t=0.93$, in Table 2 and $\beta=0.002$, $t=0.52$, in Table 3). Thus Hypothesis 1 is not supported.

Moderating effects. To test for the moderating effect of family intention, we construct two interaction variables, *family ownership*family succession intention (FOXsuc)*, *family ownership*family control intention (FOXint)*. Hypothesis 2 argues that family ownership promotes more long-term orientation behavior when they family control and family succession intention are higher. In model 3, the coefficient for the interaction term (*FOXsuc*) is positive and significant ($\beta=0.462$, $t=1.75$, in Table 2; $\beta=0.011$, $t=1.91$, in Table 3), indicating family succession intention strengthens the positive effect of family ownership on firm long-term orientation. The coefficient for interaction term (*FOXint*) in model 4 is also positive and significant ($\beta=0.004$, $t=2.72$, in Table 2; $\beta=0.000$, $t=3.17$, in Table 3), indicating that the positive moderating effect of family control intention is also supported. Thus our hypothesis 2 is supported.

Table 3. OLS Regression of long-term orientation on family ownership (LTO_PC as dependent

	variable)			
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
FIRMAGE	-0.003 (-0.58)	-0.004 (-0.63)	-0.004 (-0.79)	-0.003 (-0.56)
LNEMP	0.020 (1.11)	0.021 (1.15)	0.021 (1.14)	0.018 (0.98)

UNDER PEER REVIEW

AGE	0.001	0.001	-0.000	0.001
	(0.45)	(0.49)	(-0.01)	(0.44)
GENDER	-0.044	-0.045	-0.047	-0.045
	(-0.50)	(-0.51)	(-0.54)	(-0.51)
EDU	-0.049**	-0.050**	-0.056**	-0.048**
	(-2.15)	(-2.21)	(-2.58)	(-2.10)
ROS	0.262***	0.262***	0.259***	0.263***
	(10.21)	(10.42)	(10.40)	(10.66)
MARINDEX	-0.031***	-0.031***	-0.031**	-0.031***
	(-2.58)	(-2.58)	(-2.57)	(-2.63)
FO		0.126	0.011	0.142
		(0.93)	(0.07)	(1.08)
SUC			-0.299	
			(-1.30)	
FOX SUC			0.462*	
			(1.75)	
FINT				-0.046*
				(-1.84)
FOXINT				0.004***
				(2.72)
_CONS	0.511**	0.398*	0.572**	0.519**
	(2.22)	(1.69)	(2.36)	(2.10)

Adjusted R ²	0.087	0.087	0.089	0.088
F Value	7.142***	7.117***	7.085***	7.391***

270 *t* statistics in parentheses

271 * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

272

273 **Table 4. OLS Regression of long-term orientation on family ownership (LTO_MEAN as dependent**
 274 **variable)**

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
FIRMAGE	-0.000 (-0.33)	-0.000 (-0.36)	-0.000 (-0.45)	-0.000 (-0.27)
LNEMP	0.001 (1.59)	0.001 (1.61)	0.001 (1.60)	0.001 (1.45)
AGE	0.000 (0.97)	0.000 (1.00)	0.000 (0.65)	0.000 (0.91)
GENDER	-0.002 (-0.91)	-0.002 (-0.91)	-0.002 (-0.94)	-0.002 (-0.91)
EDU	-0.002*** (-2.91)	-0.002*** (-2.97)	-0.002*** (-3.25)	-0.002*** (-2.90)
ROS	0.006*** (8.01)	0.006*** (8.09)	0.006*** (8.02)	0.006*** (8.28)
MARINDEX	-0.000 (-1.05)	-0.000 (-1.05)	-0.000 (-1.02)	-0.000 (-1.13)
FO		0.002	-0.001	0.002

		(0.52)	(-0.20)	(0.65)
SUC			-0.009 [*]	
			(-1.66)	
FOXSUC			0.011 [*]	
			(1.91)	
FINT				-0.001 [*]
				(-1.91)
FOXINT				0.000 ^{***}
				(3.17)
_CONS	0.017 ^{***}	0.015 ^{***}	0.019 ^{***}	0.019 ^{***}
	(3.30)	(2.97)	(3.51)	(3.31)
Adjusted R ²	0.081	0.081	0.082	0.084
F Value	6.085 ^{***}	6.071 ^{***}	6.091 ^{***}	6.246 ^{***}

t statistics in parentheses
^{*} $p < 0.1$, ^{**} $p < 0.05$, ^{***} $p < 0.01$

The results for the control variables are worthwhile to note. Most of the control variables are not significantly correlated with firm long-term orientation, except for entrepreneur education, firm previous performance and market development. Our results show that entrepreneur education and market development are negatively related with firm long-term orientation and firm previous performance is positively related with firm long-term orientation. The direct effect of moderators on long-term orientation also seems interesting. While family control intention may restrain firm long-term orientation, but helps strengthen the effect of

285 family ownership on long-term investment.

286

287 5. Conclusions

288

289 Our study provides evidence on family firm heterogeneity in China. Although family firms are
290 the dominant form of Chinese private enterprises, they may differ in governance,
291 entrepreneurship and strategic behaviors. We empirically tested the characteristics of family
292 firms who showed more long-term orientation, using the 9th Private Enterprise Survey in
293 China. The results indicate that family ownership may not be the sufficient conditions for
294 long-term orientation. Family ownership is positively related to long-term orientation, but
295 insignificant. Further moderating effect examination showed that only in those family firms
296 with succession intention and strong family control intention, family ownership would
297 promote the long-term oriented investments.

298

299 This study implies that family firms do not perform the same long-term orientation. The
300 essence relies on family intention, both in succession and control. In reality, not all family
301 firms expect to pass the business to the next generation and controlled by the enlarged
302 family. Even some family firms are planning to exit for the wicked institutional environment or
303 the lack of proper descendents. Thus, we identify with the family firm heterogeneity proposal
304 and suggest exploring more on the essence of family business, rather just the external
305 structure. That also may be the reason why family business performance studies can not
306 reach an agreement. In future research, family business scholars should investigate more

relations between the essence of family influence and firm strategic behaviors.

REFERENCES

1. Anderson R C, Reeb D M. Founding-family ownership and firm performance: evidence from the S&P 500. *The Journal of Finance*. 2003; 58(3):1301-1328.
2. Anderson H G. Why U.S. managers might be more short-run oriented than the Japanese?. *Economic Commentary*. 1991; Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland (November).
3. Lavery K J. Economic short-termism: The debate, the unresolved issues and the implications for management practice and research. *Academy of Management Review*. 1996; 21(3): 825-860.
4. Lumpkin G T, Brigham K H, Moss T W. Long-term orientation: Implications for the entrepreneurial orientation and performance of family business. *Entrepreneurship & Regional Development*. 2010; 22(3-4): 241-264.
5. Zahra S A, Hayton J C, Salvato C, Entrepreneurship in family versus non-family firms: A resource-based analysis of the effect of corporate culture. *Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice*. 2004; 28(4): 363-381.
6. Astrachan J H, Klein S B, Smyrnios K X. The F-PEC scale of family influence: A proposal for solving the family business definition problem. *Family Business Review*. 2002; 15(1): 45-58.
7. James H S. Owner as manager, extended horizons and the family firm. *International Journal of the Economics of Business*. 1999; 6(1): 41-55.
8. Miller D, Le Breton-Miller I. *Managing for the long run: lessons in competitive advantage from great family businesses*. Boston, MA: Harvard Business School Press; 2005.
9. Gomez-Mejia, L R, Haynes K, Nunez-Nickel M, Jacobson K, Moyano-Fuentes J. Socioemotional wealth and business

- risks in family controlled firms: Evidence from spanish olive oil mills. *Administrative Science Quarterly*. 2007; 52(1):
106–137.
10. Kellermanns F W, Eddleston K A, Barnett T, Pearson A. An exploratory study of family member characteristics and
involvement: Effects on entrepreneurial behavior in the family firm. *Family Business Review*. 2008; 21(1): 1–14.
11. Villalonga B, Amit R. How do family ownership, control, and management affect firm value?.*Journal of Financial
Economics*. 2006; 80(): 385–417.
12. McConaughy D, Matthews C, Fialko A. Founding family controlled firms: Performance, risk, and value. *Journal of
Small Business Management*. 2001; 39(1): 31–49.
13. Chrisman J J, Chua J H, Steier L P. The influence of national culture and family involvement on entrepreneurial
perceptions and performance at the state level. *Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice*. 2002; 26(4):113–130.
14. Zellweger T. Time horizon, cost of equity capital, and generic investment strategies of firms. *Family Business Review*.
2007; 20(1):1–15.
15. Porter M E. Capital Disadvantage: America's failing capital investment system. *Harvard Business Review*. 1992;
70(5):65-82.
16. Van de Stede W A. The relationship between two consequences of budgetary controls: budgetary slack creation and
managerial short-term orientation. *Accounting, Organizations and Society*. 2000; 25(6): 609-622.
17. Davis J H, Schoorman F D, Donaldson L. Toward a stewardship theory of management. *Academy of Management
Review*. 1997; 22(1): 20-47.
18. Eddleston K A, Kellermanns F W. Destructive and productive family relationships: A stewardship theory perspective.
Journal of Business Venturing. 2007; 22(4): 545-565.
19. Block J H. Long-term orientation of family firms: An investigation of R&D investments, downsizing practices, and
executive pay. Gabler Verlag; 2009.

- 351 20. Ward J L. Perpetuating the family business. Marietta: Family Enterprise Publishers; 2004.
- 352 21. Poza E J. Family business, 2nd ed. Mason, OH: Thomson South-Western; 2007.
- 353 22. Casson M. The economics of the family firm. Scandinavian Economic History Review. 1999; 47(1): 10-23.
- 354 23. Habbershon T G, Pistrui J. Enterprising families domain: family-influenced ownership groups in pursuit of
355 transgenerational wealth. Family Business Review. 2002; 15(3): 223–237.
- 356 24. Zhou W B. Political connections and entrepreneurial investment: Evidence from China's transition economy. Journal
357 of Business Venturing. 2013; 28(2): 299-315.
- 358 25. Berrone P, Cruz C, Gomez-Mejia LR. Socioemotional wealth in family firms: Theoretical dimensions, assessment
359 approaches, and agenda for future research. Family Business Review. 2012; 25(3): 258-279.
- 360 26. Miller D, Le Breton-Miller I., Deconstructing socioemotional wealth. Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice. 2014;
361 38(4): 713–720.
- 362 27. Li X C, Ren L X. Family intention and governance behavior of private-owned enterprises in China. Journal of Sun
363 Yat-Sen University. 2004; 44(6): 239-248. Chinese.
- 364 28. Chua J H, Chrisman J J, Sharma P. Defining the family business by behavior. Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice.
365 1999; 23(4): 19-39.
- 366